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ABSTRACT
A number of theories have been developed that 
attempt to explain the role of bank loans and public 
debt in corporate financing. Research suggests that 
banks may have a comparative advantage in performing at 
least two valuable functions, information gathering and 
monitoring. The primary responsibility of analysts is 
also to gather and disseminate information on firms. 
However, it is not known how analysts following affects 
market response to bank loan announcements. The purpose 
of this study was to 1) determine whether financial 
analyst following affects market response to bank loan 
announcements and 2 ) to determine whether firms 
receiving bank loans actively seek the attention of 
analysts less than firms not receiving bank loans.
Results indicate that there is an analyst following 
effect that is not accounted for by firm size alone. In 
addition, the reputation of the analyst or brokerage is 
significant for portfolios of favorable loan 
announcements. Finally, the importance of both following 
and reputation measures seems to vary depending on the 
type of loan announcement (favorable or unfavorable) and 
firm size.
Contrary to expectations, firms announcing bank 
loans have lower share prices and make more
vi
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presentations to the NYSSA after controlling for size 
than other firms within the same industry. These results 
indicate that firms announcing bank loans are actively 
seeking the attention of analysts more than other firms.
Finally, other variables which banking theory 
suggests may influence market response to bank loan 
announcements are found to be significant for particular 
loan type by firm size portfolios of firms. Significant 
variables include industry classification, the relative 
size of the loan, the number of banks participating in 
the loan, and the length of time firm data has been 
available on the CRSP tapes.
vii
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CHAPTER ONE
OVERVIEW OF THE STUDY
A number of theories have been developed that 
attempt to explain the role of bank loans and public 
debt in corporate financing (Fama 1985; Diamond 1991; 
Easterwood and Kadapakkam 19 91). These theories suggest 
that there is something unique about bank loans that 
other types of debt cannot provide. Fama (1985, 34) 
states that "the monitoring services purchased from 
banks can help explain the comparative advantage of bank 
loans for some borrowers." Easterwood and Kadapakkam 
(1991, 49) observe that evidence gathered from examining 
stock price reactions to various types of debt is 
"consistent with a unique role for private debt in 
resolving informational asymmetries." Thus, research 
suggests that banks may have a comparative advantage in 
performing at least two valuable functions: (1 )
information gathering and (2 ) monitoring.
The primary responsibility of analysts is to gather 
and disseminate information on firms. They also monitor 
management performance. Moyer, Chatfield, and Sisneros
1
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2(1989) find empirical support for the suggestion that 
the demand for the monitoring activities of security 
analysts is influenced by the information demands of 
investors. Technological developments have increased the 
amount of information analysts are able to gather. A 
recent article in Institutional Investor states that 
"until the mid-1980s, one of an analyst's goals was to 
be first to reach a company after its quarterly earnings 
announcement. Now, with multiple faxing and conference 
calls, Wall Streeters all get the same information at 
the same time" (1991, 82). Many suggest that the tools 
analysts have acquired have improved the quality of 
analysts' services. Edward Schollmeyer (1991, 82), a 
consultant and former leading analyst, contends that 
"analysts today know more about some companies than the 
companies themselves do." Consequently, increased 
information production and monitoring by analysts result 
in reduced information asymmetry. James Balog (1991,
81), Chairman of the 1838 Investment Advisors Corp., 
states that "overall, analysts today are doing a better 
job, the American investor is better informed than ever 
before."
Research Questions 
Both banks and financial analysts monitor and 
gather information about firms. It is not known,
R eproduced  with perm ission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without perm ission.
3however, how analyst following affects market response
to hank loan announcements. If analysts are partial
substitutes for the information gathering and monitoring
services of banks, then increased analyst following
should reduce the information content of bank loan
announcements beyond that associated with firm size
alone. This question is important for several reasons.
First, analysts are among the primary users of financial
accounting information. It is important, therefore, for
accountants to understand the role analysts play in
financial markets (Schipper, 1991). Second, research
suggests that banks may provide unique services that are
not replicated by the market.
Research Question 1: Does analyst following affect 
market response to bank loan announcements beyond 
that associated with firm size alone?
To answer this question the effects of analyst
following on the information content of bank loan
announcements will be separated from firm size effects.
There is a substantial amount of theoretical and
empirical evidence indicating that the reputation of
information providers is important (Klein and Leffler
1981; Titman and Trueman 1986; Slovin, Sushka, and
Hudson 1990; Stickel 1992). Therefore, the effects of
analyst and brokerage reputation on market response to
the bank loan announcements will also be examined.
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4This study also has implications for leveraged 
firms. Moyer, Chatfield, and Sisneros (1383, 503} state 
that "analysts play the role of monitors of managerial 
performance as a means of reducing agency costs of debt 
and equity." Therefore, firms may try to attract the 
attention of analysts as a means of reducing agency 
costs of debt. Alternatively, firms may choose bank 
monitoring. Diamond (1991, 716) suggests that if moral 
hazard is sufficiently widespread, then some borrowers 
will begin their reputation acquisition by being 
monitored by banks and later switch to issuing publicly 
placed debt.
Research Question 2: Do firms receiving bank loans 
seek the attention of analysts less actively than 
firms not receiving bank loans?
Through an examination of corporate presentations 
to the New York Security Analysts Association (NYSSA) 
and share price, this study will provide insight into 
whether firms receiving bank loans seek the attention of 
analysts less actively than firms not receiving bank 
loans.
The answer to this research question has important 
regulatory implications. Concern is often expressed over 
the welfare of uninformed traders. For this reason, the 
Securities Exchange Commission (SEC) prohibits the use 
of inside information. However, security analyst
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5research is an important aspect of the current 
information dissemination process. Beaver (1978, 33) 
states that "from the onset, the SEC has implicitly- 
relied upon the existence of a professional community in 
order to justify its apparatus as an effective means of 
disclosure." Insight into whether firms receiving bank 
loans seek the attention of analysts less actively than 
firms not receiving bank loans may help regulators 
"balance between allowing effective information 
dissemination and avoiding giving an unfair advantage to 
particular investor groups" (Walmsley, Yadav, and Rees, 
1992, 571).
Research Hypotheses
Hypotheses one and two examine the first research
question: Does analyst following affect market response
to bank loan announcements beyond that associated with
firm size alone? If analysts are partial substitutes for
the information gathering and monitoring services of
banks, then increases in the number and reputation of
analysts and brokerages following a firm should reduce
the information content of bank loan announcements
beyond that associated with firm size alone.
Hoi: Analyst following does not reduce market
response to bank loan announcements beyond 
that associated with firm size alone.
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6Hal: Analyst following reduces market response to
bank loan announcements beyond that associated
Wi £ i  jl iiTui 5 1Z6 3.10116 .
Ho2: Higher reputation brokerage and analyst
following does not reduce market response to 
loan announcements more than lower reputation 
brokerage and analyst following.
Ha2: Higher reputation brokerage and analyst
following reduces market response to bank loan 
announcements more than lower reputation 
brokerage and analyst following.
Hypotheses three and four examine the second 
research question: Do firms receiving bank loans seek 
the attention of analysts less actively than firms not 
receiving bank loans? If firms receiving bank loans do 
seek the attention of analysts less actively than firms 
not receiving bank loans, then significantly higher 
share prices and significantly fewer presentations to 
the NYSSA would be expected for these firms.
Ho3: The share prices of firms receiving bank loans 
are equal to or less than share prices 
of firms not receiving bank loans.
Ha3: Share prices of firms receiving bank loans are 
higher than share prices of firms not 
receiving bank loans.
Ho4: The number of presentations made to the New 
York Society of Securities Analysts by firms 
receiving bank loans is equal to or greater 
than the number of presentations made by 
firms not receiving bank loans.
Ha4: The number of presentations made to the New 
York Society of Securities Analysts by firms 
receiving bank loans is lower than the number 
of presentations made by firms not receiving 
bank loans.
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7Research Method 
To answer the research questions, a sample of firms 
receiving bank loans will be obtained by searching the 
Dow Jones News Wire for the period 1987 through 1992 for 
announcements of bank loan agreements. For hypotheses 
one and two, firms will be retained if there are no 
other major firm announcements in the five-day period 
surrounding the loan announcement1. For hypotheses three 
and four, firms will be retained if there are no other 
equity or public debt issues within the year.
Loans will be classified as either: (1) initial
loans, (2) favorable renewals, or (3) unfavorable 
renewals on the basis of information contained in the 
announcement. Loan agreements will be classified as new 
if the announcement indicates it is new (or does not 
indicate it is a renewal) and a search of the borrower's 
annual Form 10-k confirms that it is not a revision of 
an existing bank loan. Unfavorable loan renewals include 
cancellations, reductions in lending limits, or a 
tightening of loan restrictions.
Empirical evidence indicates that the industry to 
which a firm belongs influences a number of events. 
Industry membership has been found to influence both the
1 Major firm annoucements include earnings and dividend annoucements, 
debt and equity issues, acquisitions, and management changes.
R eproduced  with perm ission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without perm ission.
8information content of earnings announcements (Bhushan
i J o ju /  auaxyoi. xuxxuwxuy ^onuariall X3 0 3 a ; I’lOyer,
Chatfield, and Sisneros 1989). Bhushan (1989a, 271) 
states that "the nature of the industry affects the cost 
of acquiring information: for some industries, 
information may be inexpensive to acquire, while for 
others one may have to spend considerable resources to 
get any information." Foster (1986) notes that industry 
forecasts and conditions also enter into the analysis of 
bank loan decisions. Therefore, the control sample for 
tests of hypotheses three and four will consist of firms 
within the same industry that do not receive a bank 
loan.
Standard event study methodology will be used to 
determine share price response to bank loan 
announcements. The market model will be used to 
calculate expected returns in the absence of a bank loan 
announcement for individual firms. Abnormal returns are 
the difference between the actual returns observed at 
the time of the loan announcement and the returns 
predicted by the market model regression. The abnormal 
returns will then be standardized to reflect statistical 
error in the determination of expected returns. Next, 
the standardized abnormal returns will be aggregated
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9across firms. Statistical tests of significance will be 
based, on aggregated abnormal returns.
Brown and Warner (1985) find that tests continue to 
be well-specified as the event period is lengthened, but 
that the power of these tests decreases dramatically. In 
order to maintain the power of the statistical tests 
employed, the shortest possible event period will be 
used. Peterson (1989) notes that obtaining the date of 
news releases does not indicate whether the market 
receives the information during trading hours unless the 
time of the news releases are also obtained. If news is 
released after trading hours, market response will occur 
on the day following the announcement. Therefore, the 
announcement day is the day the Dow Jones News Service 
reports the announcement or the next day if the 
announcement is made after the close of trading.
Next, firm specific factors will be examined as a 
means of explaining the observed abnormal returns. This 
study will examine four factors: (1 ) the number of
analysts and brokerages following a firm, (2 ) the 
reputation of analysts and brokerages following a firm, 
(3) firm share price, and (4) the number of 
presentations made to the New York Society of Security 
Analysts. The observed abnormal returns will be 
associated with these factors through regression
R eproduced  with perm ission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without perm ission.
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analysis. Additional controls for firm specific factors 
found to be significant in previous research will also 
be included.
Expected Contribution
The results of this study will indicate whether 
banks have some unique advantage in information 
gathering and monitoring that is not replicated 
elsewhere in the market or whether financial analysts 
are partial substitutes for these services. Results will 
also separate the affects of analyst following and firm 
size on the information content of bank loan 
announcements. In addition, the regressions examining 
share price and presentations to the NYSSA will provide 
some indication as to whether firms receiving bank loans 
seek the attention of analysts less actively than firms 
within the same industry on receiving bank loans.
Certain limitations of the study must be 
recognized, however. First, in examining whether firms 
actively seek the attention of analysts only share 
prices and NYSSA presentations are considered. There may 
be a number of other steps firms might take to attract 
analysts' attention. Second, presentations to the NYSSA 
are only an indirect measure of the amount of contact 
between analysts and the firm. Presentations are only
R eproduced  with perm ission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without perm ission.
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the end of a spectrum of possible contacts between the 
firm and analysts.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows: 
Chapter II discusses literature relevant to the proposed 
research questions, Chapter III describes the data and 
methodology to be used, Chapter IV discusses the 
empirical findings of the study, and Chapter V contains 
a summary and concluding remarks.
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LITERATURE REVIEW
This chapter reviews the research literature 
relevant to market response to bank loan announcements 
and analyst following. Section one reviews the 
development of loan announcement studies in general and 
bank loan announcements in particular. The second 
section reviews studies that have examined: 1) the 
effects of analyst following on various firm 
announcements and 2) firm characteristics that influence 
analyst following. Section Three reviews theoretical and 
empirical studies of firm share price. The last section 
reviews research on presentations to the New York 
Society of Security Analysts (NYSSA).
Loan Announcements 
Fama (1985) provides a theoretical analysis of 
why firms use inside debt versus public debt. Inside 
debt is defined as "a contract where the debtholder gets 
access to information from an organization's decision 
process not otherwise publicly available" (36). His
12
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theory centers around the information requirements for 
inside and publicly traded debt. Banks, as inside 
debtholders, have access to a firm's private 
information. In contrast, holders of publicly traded 
debt must rely on publicly available data. Therefore, 
sufficient publicly available information about the firm 
is necessary for public debt to be a viable means of 
financing. Fama (198 5) suggests that for some firms it 
is less costly to give one agent (banker) access to the 
firm's decision process than to produce the range of 
publicly available information necessary to make public 
debt a viable means of financing. Thus, bank debt may be 
more advantageous for firms for which little public 
information is available.
Fama (1985) also suggests that an analysis of the 
effects of reserve requirements on certificates of 
deposit provides evidence that banks provide some unique 
services. Banks finance loans with certificates of 
deposit (CD's) that are subject to reserve requirements. 
This reserve tax is borne by bank borrowers making bank 
interest rates higher than interest rates on other 
securities of equivalent risk. Therefore, Fama (1985,
29) concludes that "there must be something special 
about banks that prevents other intermediaries from
R eproduced  with perm ission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without perm ission.
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competing to assure that it never pays to finance loans 
with CD's .:I
Stronger evidence for the uniqueness of bank loans 
is provided by studies that examine stock price 
reactions to various financing announcements. Results 
indicate that bank loans convey positive information to 
market participants. Studies consistently find 
significant positive abnormal returns at the time of 
bank loan announcements. In contrast, straight public 
debt issues do not result in any statistically 
significant market reaction (Mikkelson and Partch 1986; 
James 1987) .
The differences in market response to bank loans 
and public debt is consistent with the inside-debt 
argument. However, both Mikkelson and Partch (1986) and 
James (1987) finds that there are no positive abnormal 
returns for debt privately placed with institutional 
investors. James examines 37 private debt placements 
over the 1974 to 1983 period 70 percent of which are 
with insurance companies. Mikkelson and Partch examine 
80 private placements over the 1972 to 1982 period. In 
addition, both studies examine whether loan 
characteristics or characteristics of the borrower can 
explain the difference in market response to straight
R eproduced  with perm ission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without perm ission.
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debt, bank loans, and other privately place debt. The 
stated purpose of the loan, loan size, size of the 
offering relative to the firm's market value of common 
stock, loan maturity, borrower size, and borrower 
default risk do not explain the difference. Mikkelson 
and Partch (1986, 3) conclude that "the type of security 
is the only significant determination of the price 
response." Therefore, the non-positive market response 
to debt privately placed with institutional investors 
suggests that the inside-debt argument only partially 
explains the market's response to bank loans. James 
(1987, 217) concludes that this evidence indicates 
"banks provide some special service with their lending 
activity that is not available from other lenders."
Researchers indicate that banks appear to have a 
comparative advantage in performing at least two 
valuable services: 1 ) information gathering and 2 ) 
monitoring. Diamond (1984) develops a theory of 
financial intermediation which argues that 
intermediaries such as banks have a cost advantage in 
the production of information. James (1987, 21) notes 
that recent theories of intermediation imply that "bank 
loans are different from publicly placed debt because 
banks know more about a company's prospects than other
R eproduced  with perm ission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without perm ission.
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investors do." Diamond (1991) suggests that another 
important function of banks is the monitoring of their 
debt contract which alleviates the moral hazard problem. 
Banks have a cost advantage in monitoring because "the 
alternative is either duplication of effort if each 
lender monitors directly, or a free-rider problem, in 
which case no lender monitors" (Diamond 1991, 3 93) .
Recent studies have expanded the literature by 
providing empirical support for the theoretical argument 
that banks have a comparative advantage over other 
lenders in performing information gathering and 
monitoring services. These studies separate bank loan 
announcements into the following three categories: (1 )
initial loans, (2) favorable renewals, and (3) 
unfavorable renewals. In the aggregate, favorable 
renewals of bank loan agreements consistently result in 
significantly positive abnormal stock price reactions. 
Best and Zhang (1993, 1511) conclude that these results 
confirm that "the process of monitoring and evaluation 
by banks conveys useful information to the market." 
Unfavorable loan renewals that reduce lending limits or 
tighten loan restrictions result in negative stock price 
reactions (Lummer and McConnell 1989; Slovin, Johnson, 
and Glascock 1992; Best and Zhang 1993).
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Evidence regarding market response to initial bank 
loans is not as consistent as the response to loan 
renewals. Lummer and McConnell (1989) and Best and Zhang 
(19 93) find no significant abnormal returns for new 
credit agreements. However, Slovin, Johnson, and 
Glascock (1992, 1058) find that initial loans are 
favorable events once firm size is taken into 
consideration. They conclude that banks provide several 
elements of financial activity, including "processing of 
private information and associated monitoring of firm 
activities" (1065).
In addition to separating the total sample of bank 
loan announcements according to bank loan type, Slovin, 
Johnson and Glascock (1992) examine the affects of firm 
size. Their findings indicate that when a sample of bank 
loan announcements is grouped according to firm size, 
positive stock price reactions occur only for the sample 
of small firms. As a group, large firms experience only 
normal returns. These results imply that the amount of 
information regarding a firm which is publicly available 
may influence market response to the bank loan 
announcement. The empirical results of previous loan 
announcement studies are given in Table 1.
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Table 2-1
T  / " N * v r  7\ T S T T S T /^ rT ^ rr’ T p* *T?*>Trn n m T ’ T M n r '
■ L jvoru .M  x  o i u l / x £ j O
Announcement Period Excess Returns (%)
Public
Debt
Bank
Loan
Initial Favorable Unfavorable 
Loans Renewals Renewals
Mikkelson & 
Partch 
1986
NS .89
James
1987
NS 1.93
Lummer & 
McConnell 
1989
.61 NS . 87 -3 . 96
Slovin,
Johnson,
Glascock
1992
1.31 1.09 1.55 -2 .39
Best &. 
Zhang 
1993
.32 NS .75 -2 . 92
NS denotes statistically insignificant results
Analyst Following
The amount of information regarding a firm which is 
publicly available depends to a large extent on the 
information production and dissemination activities of 
financial analysts. Due to the important role analysts 
play in providing information to the public a number of 
studies attempt to determine which firms analysts will 
follow. Specific firm characteristics have been 
identified as influencing analyst following. Early 
studies focused on one characteristic in particular,
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firm size. Bhushan (1989a) and Moyer, Chatfield, and 
Sisneros (1989) investigate firm characteristics other 
than size that determine which companies analysts will 
follow. Before initiating an information search analysts 
compare search costs with the possible economic value of 
the information obtained. Findings, reported in Table 2,
Table 2-2
FIRM CHARACTERISTICS OF ANALYST FOLLOWING
Moyer. Chatfield. Sisneros 1989
1. Size (+)
2. % of Institutional Owners (+)
3. Growth Rate for the Last 5 Years (+)
4. Long Term Debt/Common Equity (-)
5. % Insiders (-)
6 . # Owners (+)
7. Industry
Bhushan 1989
1. Size (+)
2. # Institutional Owners (+)
3. Return Variability (+)
4. % Insiders (-)
5. Correlation of Firm Returns with Market Returns (+)
6 . # Lines of Business (-)
7. % of Institutional Owners (+)
8 . Industry
(+) denotes a positive relation with analyst following
(-) denotes a negative relation with analyst following
indicate that a number of factors influence analyst 
activity including ownership structure, return 
variability, correlation of firm returns with the market 
return, industry, and firm complexity.
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Dempsey (1989) examines market response to 2,466 
annual earnings announcements over the 1976 to 1982 
period. Results indicate that increased analyst 
following reduces the information content of earnings 
announcements. Dempsey controls for firm size since a 
number of studies find that small firms experience 
greater security price reactions to earnings 
announcements than large firms (Atiase 1985; Bamber 
1986; Freeman 1987). In univariate regressions both a 
firm size and an analyst following effect are observed. 
However, in the multiple regression model analyst 
following continues to be significant while firm size 
does not. The results of an off-diagonal analysis with 
dichotomous firm size and analyst following measures 
indicate that thinly followed large firms have 
significantly larger price responses than widely 
followed small firms. Dempsey (749) states that his 
findings are "consistent with analysts' use of a 
multivariate search incentive framework as provided in 
Bhushan (1989a)." Dempsey's findings are also consistent 
with Arbel and Strebel (1983) and Carvell and Strebel's 
(1987) research on the neglected firm effect. Arbel and 
Strebel (1983) find that after controlling for size, the 
number of analysts following a firm is negatively
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related to the firm's annual return. The authors explain 
the effect as a premium for information.
Dempsey's findings that analyst following reduces 
market reaction to earnings announcements beyond that 
associated with firm size alone is not surprising given 
that the primary outputs of analysts are earnings 
forecasts. It is not as obvious whether increased 
analyst following will reduce market reaction to bank 
loan announcements. Research suggests that banks may 
provide unique services that are not replicated by the 
market. Bank loan announcements not only signal the 
favorableness of the private information gathered by the 
bank, but also indicate that the firm will be monitored 
by the bank during the loan period. However, the firm 
size effect observed by Slovin, Johnson, and Glascock 
(1992) indicates the amount of publicly available 
information regarding a firm may influence market 
response to bank loan announcements.
Reputation
A simplifying assumption made in most studies that 
examine analyst following is that analysts do not differ 
in quality. However, there is a substantial amount of 
theoretical and empirical evidence indicating that the 
reputation of information providers is important.
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Klein and Leffler's (1981) reputation model 
demonstrates the importance of reputations in providing 
incentives to assure contract performance in the absence 
of third-party enforcement. A key point in the model is 
the value of future business which they refer to as the 
repeat-purchase mechanism. In order for the repeat- 
purchase mechanism to work the present discounted value 
of future income must be greater that the one-time 
benefit obtained from cheating. The amount invested in 
nonsalvagable capital costs are the means of signaling 
to the market that the firm has too much to lose by 
cheating. In the case of analyst's forecasts, brokerage 
houses have substantial investments in human capital 
with specialized expertise which they would not want to 
jeopardize.
Titman and Trueman (1986) extend the reputation 
literature by developing a model where the quality of 
the outside information producers is informative to 
market participants. Empirical support for the Titman 
and Trueman model is provided by a number of studies 
that examine the reputation effects of various 
information providers. Carter and Manaster (1990) find a 
significant negative relation between underwriter 
reputation and the magnitude of initial public offerings
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price run-ups. Slovin, Sushka, and Hudson (1990) find 
evidence chat investment banker reputation and the 
quality of the public accounting firm used are important 
factors in seasoned equity issues. More prestigious 
investment bankers and accounting firms lessen the 
negative response to seasoned equity issues.
The financial press often expresses the opinion 
that the reputation of analysts is also important. For 
example, a recent article in Business Week states that 
"sometimes, shares soar when they're recommended by a 
well-known research analyst" (Spiro, 1993, 87).
Stickel's (1992) findings support the argument that 
there is a significant difference in the forecasts of 
security analysts. Examination of more than 40,000 
earnings forecast revisions per year for the years 1981 
to 1985 indicate that forecasts of analysts on the 
Institutional Investor All-American Research Team are 
superior to those of other analysts in several ways. 
First, contemporaneous forecasts of the All-American 
Research Team are more accurate. Secondly, All-Americans 
supply forecasts more frequently than other analysts. 
Finally, large upward revisions in earnings forecasts 
made by All-American Research Team members result in a 
greater security price response than large revisions by
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other analysts (Stickel 1992) . The affects of analyst 
and broker reputation on market response to bank loan 
announcements has not been examined.
Share Price
Moyer, Chatfield, and Sisneros (1989, 503) contend 
that "analysts play the role of monitors of managerial 
performance as a means of reducing agency costs of debt 
and equity." Therefore, firms may try to attract the 
attention of analysts as a means of reducing agency costs 
of debt. Alternatively, firms may choose bank monitoring. 
Diamond (1991, 716) suggests that if moral hazard is 
sufficiently widespread, then some borrowers will begin 
their reputation acquisition by being monitored by banks 
and later switch to issuing publicly placed debt.
Firm characteristics studied by Bhushan (198 9) and 
Moyer, Chatfield, and Sisneros (1989) that influence 
analyst following are relatively stable and not easily 
changed. However, there are at least two means by which 
firms are able to attract analysts' attention without 
making major firm changes. Research indicates that firms 
can also attract analyst attention by: 1 ) increasing the 
potential economic benefit of information searches by 
lowering share price and 2 ) reducing analyst search 
costs by providing information to analysts through
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direct contact. Firms that receive information gathering 
and monitoring services from hanks via hank loans may 
seek the attention of analysts less actively than firms 
not receiving bank loans.
There are competing theories as to why firms lower 
share prices through stock splits. However, "it is clear 
that firms attempt to manage the unit price of their 
shares by stock splits and occasional reverse splits and 
there is a strong relation between the price per share 
and the size of the firm" (Brennan and Hughes 1991,
1665). It is often suggested that there is an optimal 
price range for common stock which insures liquidity. 
This 'liquidity' argument suggests that share prices 
must be kept sufficiently low to widen the market. 
Alternatively, Brennan and Hughes (1991) suggest that 
low share prices provide compensation for financial 
analysts' information gathering and dissemination 
activities.
Garbade and Silber (1979) define liquidity as the 
variance of the difference between realized price and 
the equilibrium value of an asset at the time a person 
decides to trade. One of two conditions must be present 
for an asset to be considered liquid, a relatively 
stable equilibrium price or frequent trading. For an
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asset with a volatile equilibrium price to be liquid it 
must be traded frequently. Trading frequency reduces che 
chance of a substantial price change between the time a 
market participant decides to trade and the time the 
market ultimately clears. Trading frequency is a 
function of the number of market participants and is 
positively related to market size. Equity issues, such 
as common stock, are considered to have volatile prices. 
Therefore, a liquid equities market must be large enough 
to allow for frequent market clearing (trading).
In examining the liquidity effects of stock splits, 
Copeland (1979) finds that there is an increase in the 
number of owners providing for a wider market. However, 
trading volume is proportionately lower after the split, 
brokerage revenues proportionately higher, and bid-ask 
spreads are higher as a percentage of the bid price. 
These factors suggest lower liquidity after the stock 
split. Copeland concludes that the larger number of 
owners is more than offset by other factors resulting in 
an overall reduction in liquidity. Ohlson and Penman 
(1985) also find that stock splits result in lower 
liquidity and higher return variances. These findings 
are inconsistent with the argument that firms lower 
share prices to increase liquidity.
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Brennan and Hughes (1991) provide an alternative 
theory to the 'liquidity' argument. Managers with good 
private information want independent third parties to 
produce information about the firm. Independent parties 
such as brokers avoid the moral hazard problems 
associated with direct payment to information producers 
for certification. Brokers are compensated for their 
effort by brokerage commissions. Brokers compare the 
cost of gathering the information necessary to issue an 
earnings forecast with the commission revenue it will 
produce for the firm. Coler and Schaefer (1988) find 
that full service brokerage commissions charged as a 
proportion of the trade are negatively related to share 
price. Therefore, lower share prices result in higher 
full service brokerage commissions thereby compensating 
brokers for their research expenditures.
Brennan and Hughes (1991) examine the relation 
between share price and analyst following for the period 
of 1976 through 1987. A total of 13,285 observations is 
obtained for firms listed on the New York Stock Exchange 
(NYSE), American Stock Exchange (AMEX), and National 
Association of Security Dealers Automated Quotation 
Systems (NASDAQ). They find that after controlling for
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firm size, the number of analysts following a firm is 
negatively related to share price.
Brennan and Hughes' empirical research establishes 
that there is a negative relationship between analyst 
following and share price. However, it is not known 
whether firms maintain certain share prices or reduce 
share prices for strategic purposes. The liquidity 
argument states that firms maintain share prices within 
an optimal price range which insures liquidity. 
Alternatively, Brennan and Hughes (1991) suggest that 
firms reduce share prices for strategic purposes when 
they want additional analyst attention.
Theoretical research shows that the amount of 
publicly available information is an important factor in 
determining the viability of public debt (Fama 1985; 
Diamond 1991). Therefore, Brennan and Hughes' (1991) 
theory would imply that firms relying on public 
financing may seek the attention of analysts by lowering 
share prices. However, "it is costly for a firm to 
reduce its share price by splitting because the 
structure of brokerage commissions makes it more costly 
to trade in low priced shares" (Brennan and Hughes 19 91, 
1665). Therefore, firms receiving banks' information 
gathering and monitoring services via bank loans may
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decide not to incur the cost of attracting additional 
analyst attention.
Presentations to New York Society of Securities Analysts
An additional method of attracting analysts' 
attention is through direct contact. The SEC has 
mandated minimum disclosure standards. However, beyond 
the minimum requirements firms are allowed considerable 
latitude in choosing how much to disclose and the venue.
Lang and Lundholm (1993) examine cross-sectional 
determinants of analyst ratings of corporate 
disclosures. Their study is based on the Report of the 
Financial Analysts Federation Corporate Information 
Committee (FAF Reports) which rates three main corporate 
disclosures: published annual information, other 
published information, and investor (analyst) relations. 
These reports are prepared by subcommittees comprising 
of the leading analysts covering the industry to which a 
firm belongs. The average committee size is thirteen. 
Lang and Lundholm (1993, 254) note that "a casual 
comparison of the analysts included on the subcommittees 
with those selected for the Institutional Investor All- 
American Research Team suggests a substantial overlap." 
Their findings demonstrate that of the three categories 
of disclosure examined by the FAF Reports ratings for
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the investor relations category varied the most. 
Published annual information varied the least. These 
results indicate that "firms can more clearly 
differentiate their investor relations efforts than 
their annual report disclosures, perhaps because the 
former permit more discretion" (Lang and Lundholm 1993, 
257) . One of the primary considerations in the investor 
relations rating is the frequency and content of 
presentations to analysts.
Discussions with a former Vice President in charge 
of investor relations at a major bank indicate that 
analyst coverage of a firm often begins when the firm 
contacts analysts covering their firm's industry. 
Analysts are given access to information not available 
to the public, but within legal guidelines. Because 
brokerage firms earn more commissions on firms they can 
sell to the public, analysts look for firms they think 
will do well.
The largest firms make regularly scheduled 
presentations to analyst associations. Other firms may 
be invited to make a presentation if they have made a 
favorable impression on an analyst. Presentations may be 
made to specific brokerage firms, local or regional 
analyst associations, or the New York Analyst
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Federation. The most prestigious meeting of analysts is 
the New York Society of Securities Analysts (NYSSA). 
Senior company officials speak at presentations to the 
NYSSA. Of the 1,141 presentations listed in the NYSSA 
calendar for the period from January 1986 to December 
1992, 99 percent were made by the corporate chief 
executive officer (CEO), chairman, or president.
Walmsley, Yadav, and Rees (1992, 572) note that 
presentations are "the formal, publicly acknowledged end 
of a spectrum of possible contacts between corporate 
management and the investment community." Generally, 
firms that present in New York have already done so at 
the local or regional level. Consequently, the 
information in the New York presentations is not new. In 
fact, interviews with Fortune 500 executives by 
Sundaram, Ogden, and Walker (19 93) indicate that 
executives specifically refrain from releasing new 
information at these meetings in order to avoid 
violating Rule 10b-5 of the Securities Exchange Act. 
However, the audience at NYSSA presentations is 
different. Analysts often invite big investors to 
attend.
There is empirical evidence that the market 
responds to NYSSA presentations. Sundaram, Ogden, and
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Walker (1993) examine market response to 1,502 corporate 
presentations no the NYSSA for the period from 1984 
through 1990. Significant positive abnormal returns are 
observed on the day of and the day after a firm's 
presentation to the New York Society of Security 
Analysts. The authors note that firms are often 
recommended by analysts in the weeks following their 
NYSSA presentations. Firm returns for presentations made 
to Financial Analysts Federation societies outside of 
New York are not significant.
Summary
Chapter Two discusses research relevant to this 
study. The review covered the following areas: 1) loan 
announcement studies, 2) analyst following studies, 3) 
reputation research, 4) firm share price literature, and 
5) research on the effects of presentations to the New 
York Society of Security Analysts.
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CHAPTER THREE
RESEARCH METHOD
The purpose of this chapter is to discuss the 
research methodology used in this study. Section one 
discusses the research questions and associated 
hypotheses. Data sources and collection methods are 
described in section two. Sections three through six 
describes the statistical methodology employed for each 
of the four hypotheses. The final section describes the 
statistical tests of the combined hypotheses.
Statements of Hypotheses
Hypotheses one and two examine the first research 
question: Does analyst following affect market response 
to bank loan announcements beyond that associated with 
firm size alone?
Hoi: Analyst following does not reduce market
response to bank loan announcements beyond that 
associated with firm size alone.
Hal: Analyst following reduces market response to
bank loan announcements beyond that associated 
with firm size alone.
Ho2: Higher reputation brokerage and analyst
following does not reduce market response to
33
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loan announcements more than lower reputation 
brokerage and analyst following.
Ha2: Higher reputation brokerage and analyst
following reduces market response to bank loan 
announcements more than lower reputation 
brokerage and analyst following.
Hypotheses three and four examine the second 
research question: Do firms receiving bank loans seek the 
attention of analysts less actively than firms not 
receiving bank loans?
Ho3: The share prices of firms receiving bank loans 
are equal to or less than share prices of firms 
not announcing bank loans.
Ha3: Share prices of firms receiving bank loans are 
higher than share prices of firms not 
announcing bank loans.
Ho4: The number of presentations made to the New 
York Society of Securities Analysts by firms 
receiving bank loans is equal to or greater 
than the number of presentations made by firms 
not announcing bank loans.
Ha4: The number of presentations made to the New 
York Society of Securities Analysts by firms 
receiving bank loans is lower than the number 
of presentations made by firms not announcing 
bank loans.
Sample Data
The sample of bank loan announcements was obtained 
by searching the Dow Jones News Service for the period 
1987 through 1992 for announcements of bank loan 
agreements. This database provides in-depth coverage of 
companies, industry, and the stock market. In addition to
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providing the full text of the loan announcement, the Dow 
Jones News Service gives the date and time the story- 
appeared on the wire. This information provides for a 
precise assessment of the announcement date.
A number of firm announcements have been found to 
affect stock prices, including earnings-related 
announcements, dividend declarations, investment
decisions, and lawsuit announcements. Therefore, the Wall
Street Journal Index was searched for other firm
announcements. Firms were retained if there were no other
major firm announcements in the five-day period 
surrounding the loan announcement.
Loans are classified as initial loans, favorable 
renewals, or unfavorable renewals on the basis of 
information contained in the announcement. Loan 
agreements are classified as initial if the announcement 
indicates it is new (or does not indicate it is a 
renewal) and a search of the borrower's Form 10-K 
confirms that it is not a revision of an existing bank 
loan. Unfavorable loan renewals include cancellations, 
reductions in lending limits, or a tightening of loan 
restrictions. The LEXIS/NEXIS database was used to obtain 
10-K information.
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Daily return data and share prices was obtained from 
the Center for Research in Security Prices (CRSP) tapes. 
The proxy for the market is the CRSP equally-weighted 
market portfolio, including all distributions. According 
to portfolio theory the market portfolio contains each 
single risky asset "in proportion to the total market 
value of that asset relative to the total value of all 
other assets" (Haugen 1990, 56). However, in comparing 
the value weighted index and the equally weighted index 
Brown and Warner (1980) find that under a variety of 
methods the equally weighted index is more likely to 
detect abnormal performance than the value weighted 
index. Peterson (1989, 60) explains that "the reason the 
equally-weighted index is superior is due to the use of 
equal-weighing of securities in the aggregation of 
security returns." Therefore, there is a greater degree 
of correlation between the equally-weighted index and 
security returns and greater precision in the estimated 
parameters.
Various proxies for firm size have been used in 
research. Foster (1986) examines the correlations and 
comovements between the following three measures: total 
assets, sales, and market capitalization. Market 
capitalization is obtained by multiplying share price by
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the number of outstanding shares of the firm. He finds 
that the correlation of market capitalization with total 
assets and sales is .86 and .87 respectively. However, 
the agreement in sign of annual change (comovement) of 
market capitalization with total assets and sales is only 
.68 and .67. In theory the market value of common stock 
is based on the discounted value of expected dividends 
throughout the life of the firm. Therefore, market 
capitalization includes market expectations of the firm's 
future growth. Expectations are not included in either 
the total assets or sales measures of firm size. This 
market expectation component of the market capitalization 
measure may account for the relatively low comovement of 
this variable with the other firm size proxies.
Therefore, to avoid redundancy in the independent 
variables the measure for firm size is total assets.
Share price is already included in the study as an 
independent variable of interest. Total asset information 
to compute firm size was obtained from the COMPUSTAT 
file. For sample firms not included on either the current 
or the research file of COMPUSTAT total firm assets was 
obtained from Standards and Poors.
The first and second hypotheses examine the affects 
of analyst following and reputation on market response to
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bank loan announcements. The number of analysts following 
a particular firm was obtained from Nelson Directory of 
Investment Research. Volume one of the directory covers 
United States companies and is arranged in seven 
sections, the largest of which is section two. The data 
in section two usually includes the firm's ticker symbol, 
exchange, lines of business, institutional holdings, 
number of shareholders, shares outstanding, key 
executives, and market value. Analyst coverage is also 
provided, including an analyst's name, research firm 
affiliation, and phone number. "Listings include all 
public companies headquartered in the United States with 
research coverage by at least one security analyst" 
(Nelson's, 1988, p. 107). Bhushan (1989) uses this source 
in examining firm characteristics and analyst following. 
The main advantage is that the annual listing provides an 
accurate count of the number of analysts following a 
firm.
Reputation is measured by inclusion on the 
Institutional Investor's annual All-American Research 
Team. Every October the Institutional Investor journal 
publishes a ranking of more than 400 U.S. analysts in 34 
firms that "have done the most outstanding work during 
the past year" (Daniells 1993 p.185) . The leading analyst
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in each industry and speciality area are referred to as 
the All American Research Team One. The list is 
constructed by sending a questionnaire to the director of 
research of approximately 8 00 money management 
organizations and to other managers regarded as important 
to clients of brokerage firms who rate analysts on stock 
selection, earnings estimates, service and accessibility, 
and written reports. Institutional Investor reporters 
then spend about two months going back to the 
institutions to solicit both positive and negative 
comments. Final ranking is then made (Institutional 
Investor, 1988). For the sample period of this study the 
number of analysts on the All-American Research Team One 
ranged from a low of 59 in 1987 to 70 in 1991.
In addition to the All-American Research Team One, 
the magazine publishes the names and brokerage 
affiliations of the second, third, and fourth place 
analysts for each industry and speciality group. The 
number of analysts in these categories is approximately 
350 per year. In this study, the second, third, and 
fourth place analysts following a sample firm are 
classified as high reputation analysts (RAF).
The names of each analyst covering a firm in the 
year of the loan announcement are compared with the
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Institutional Investor rankings of analysts for that 
year. The number of analysts, high reputation analysts, 
and team one All-American analysts are then computed. 
Since, Nelson's Directory and the Institutional 
Investor's All-American listings contain information for 
the preceding year analyst following and reputation for 
1987 loan announcements are based on the 1988 listings. 
The same procedure is used for the other sample years.
The Institutional Investor also ranks brokerages by 
the number of individual analysts on any of the four 
teams as a percentage of the firm's total number of 
analysts. For this study, brokerages with 20% or more of 
their analysts earning places on one of the teams are 
classified as high reputation brokerages (RB). There are 
approximately twenty brokerages per year that meet this 
criterion. Eighteen brokerages had 20% or more of their 
analysts on one of the teams for all six years of the 
sample period.
As stated in the literature review, evidence 
indicates that the industry to which a firm belongs 
influences a number of events including market response 
to earning announcements (Bhushan 198 9b) and analyst 
following (Bhushan 1989a; Moyer, Chatfield, and Sisneros 
1989). Therefore, the control sample for tests of
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hypotheses three and four consist of firms within the
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Control firms are obtained from COMPUSTAT and include all 
firms with the same two digit SIC code as sample firms. 
Share price and total asset information on the control 
firms are also obtained from COMPUSTAT.
The fourth hypothesis examines the number of 
presentations made by sample firms to the New York 
Society of Security Analysts (NYSSA) versus the number of 
presentations made by other firms in the same industry. 
The number of presentations made by both sample firms and 
control firms for the sample period was obtained by 
searching the NYSSA calendar for the company name. There 
are 238 sample firms and 2,413 control firms. The 
calendar which contains the names and dates of firms 
making presentations was obtained from the NYSSA for the 
period from 1986 to 1992.
Abnormal Return Calculations 
Standard event study methodology is used to 
determine share price response to bank loan 
announcements. The total sample of bank loan 
announcements is then disaggregated to find market 
response to initial loans, favorable renewals, and 
unfavorable renewals.
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Daily return data is collected for 155 days 
beginning at day -150 and ending at day +4. The 
estimation period includes returns for days -150 to -10. 
Daily returns for individual securities substantially 
depart from normality. However, Brown and Warner (1984, 
p. 213) note that "the mean excess return in a cross- 
section of securities converges to normality as the 
number of sample securities increases." Simulations 
results obtained by Brown and Warner indicate that 
standard parametric tests for significance of mean excess 
returns are well-specified.
The market model is used to calculate expected 
returns for individual firms. The market model takes into 
consideration both market-wide factors and the systematic 
risk of each sample security.
R.t = a. + (3, + e]C (1)
where: Rjc = return on security j on day t ;
R^t = CRSP equally-weighted index of
returns on AMEX and NYSE stocks on 
day t;
a, = the market model intercept term,
/?. = the market model slope estimated by
ordinary least squares regression; 
e:c = a random error term.
The abnormal return for firm j on day t is calculated as
follows:
ARj- = R3t - a3 - /S3 (2)
where: AR,. = abnormal return on security j on day t ;
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Rjt = return on security j on day t;
Qfj = the market model intercept term;
j3j = the market model slope estimated by
ordinary least squares regression;
R.nc = CRSP equally-weighted index of returns 
on AMEX and NYSE stocks on day t .
Brown and Warner (1985) find that tests continue to
be well-specified as the event period is lengthened, but 
that the power of these tests decreases dramatically. In 
order to maintain the power of the statistical tests 
employed, the shortest possible event period is used. 
Peterson (1989) notes that obtaining the date of news 
releases does not indicate whether the market receives 
the information during trading hours unless the time of 
the news releases are also obtained. If news is released 
after trading hours, market response will occur on the 
day following the announcement. Therefore, the 
announcement day is the date the Dow Jones News Service 
reports the announcement or the next trading day if the 
announcement is made after the close of trading for the 
particular exchange. The announcement day is defined as 
day 0 .
Tests of significance of the abnormal returns are 
based on standardized abnormal returns. The one-day 
standardized abnormal return for firm j is calculated as 
follows:
SAR, = I(AR:t/s;) (3)
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whereiSARj . standardarized abnormal return for firm j;
Sj = the standard error of the estimation period;
AR.^ = abnormal return on security 3 on day t .
Portfolios are then formed based on the type of loan 
announcement. The average standardized abnormal return 
for the portfolio is defined as follows:
ASAR = 1/N £ (SAR-j) for j=l to N (4)
Assuming the individual abnormal returns are cross- 
sectionally independent and normally distributed, the 
following t-statistic can be computed:
t = square root of N times ASAR.
The expected values of SAR and ASAR are positive for 
initial bank loans and favorable renewals, negative for 
unfavorable renewals and cancellations. To control for 
this difference in total sample tests that include both 
favorable and unfavorable loan announcements, whenever an 
announcement is for a cancellation or an unfavorable bank 
loan revision, the control variables are multiplied by 
negative one.
One-day abnormal returns are calculated for the 
entire sample and the sample disaggregated by size, loan 
type, exchange, time on CRSP files, one-digit SIC code, 
security, structure of the agreement, loan maturity, and 
the number of participating banks.
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Tests of Hypothesis One
Hypothesis one examines whether analyst and 
brokerage following reduces market reaction to bank loan 
announcements. The first test of this hypothesis employed 
the following univariate regression analysis:
SARj = j30 + /Sx(# analysts.;) + e: (6 )
Where:
SAR. = the standardized abnormal return ofj
firm j calculated above;
# analystSj = the number of analysts following firm j ; 
= a random error term.
The total sample of bank loan announcements is then 
disaggragated based on whether the loan is an initial 
loan, a favorable renewal, or an unfavorable renewal. 
Separate regressions are run for each portfolio. Similar 
regressions are run for the number of brokerages 
following a firm. The number of analysts and brokerages 
researching a company was obtained from Nelson's 
Directory of Investment Research in the year of the loan 
announcement. A significant negative coefficient would 
indicate that increased analyst and brokerage following 
decreases market response to bank loan announcements. 
Under the null hypothesis the coefficient is expected to 
be insignificant.
Next, multivariate regressions are conducted for the 
total sample of bank loan announcements and each
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portfolio separately to determine the relative 
explanatory power of analyst following and firm size on 
market response to the bank loan announcements. 
Multivariate regressions also test the relative 
explanatory power of brokerage following and firm size.
SAR-j = |80 + j8x (lnsize^ + j(32(# analysts^ + £-, (7)
Where: SAIL = the standardized abnormal return
of firm j calculated above; 
lnsize., = the natural logarithm of firm j
total assets;
# analysts., = the number of analysts 
researching firm j ;
£j a random error term.
Foster (1986) notes that the distribution for the 
variable firm size is fat tailed and shows evidence of 
substantial positive skewness. This departure from 
normality makes a transformation of the data necessary. 
The commonly used natural logarithmic transformation for 
a positively skewed distribution is used. Type II sum of 
squares is obtained for this regression equation. The SAS 
Type II sum of squares corresponds to the partial sums of 
squares in which each effect is adjusted for all other 
effects possible (SAS, 1992). The partial R squared 
obtained indicates the additional impact of each variable 
beyond that portion of the variance explained by the 
other variable.
R eproduced  with perm ission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without perm ission.
4 7
Tests of Hypothesis Two 
The second hypothesis examines whether the reputation 
of analysts and brokerages following a firm influences 
market reaction to the loan announcements. The first test 
of this hypothesis employs the following univariate 
regression analysis:
SAR. = /30 + /SL (# All-American Analystsj + e, (6)
Where:
SAR, = the standardized abnormal return of
j
firm j calculated above;
# analystSj = the number of analysts following firm j; 
e: = a random error term.
Univariate regressions are also used to test the 
following independent variables: number of high reputation 
analysts (RAF), number or brokerages following a firm (B), 
and the number of high reputation brokerages following a 
firm (RB). Initial loans and favorable renewals form one 
portfolio while unfavorable renewals and terminations of 
loans form the second. The portfolios are then 
disaggragated based on firm size. Separate regressions 
will be run for each portfolio of loan type by firm size.
The final tests of the reputation hypothesis examine 
the effect of the proportion of analysts and brokerages 
following a firm and the percent of high reputation 
analysts, All-American Team One analysts, and high
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reputation brokerages on market reaction to bank loan 
announcements. The variables are calculated as follows: 
Proportion of analyst following:
(PAF) = the number of analysts following a firm
the highest case of analyst following +1
Percent of All-American Team One analysts:
(PAAF) = number of All-American Team One Analysts
total number of analysts following the firm
Percent of high reputation analysts:
(PRAF) =  number of high reputation analysts
total number of analysts following the firm
Proportion of brokerage following:
(PB) = the number of brokerages following a firm
the highest case of brokerage following +1
Percent of high reputation brokerages:
(PRB) = number of high reputation brokerages
total number of brokerages following the firm
The following univariate regression is used for all the
above variables:
SAR. =/3q+/31 (PAF.) + e:
Where:
SAR, = the standardized abnormal return of
firm j ;
PAF, = the number of All-American analysts
researching firm j ;
6j = a random error term.
Again, the regressions are run for portfolios based 
on bank loan classification and firm size.
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Tests of Hypothesis Three
Hypothesis three examines whether firms receiving 
bank loans have higher share prices than firms not 
announcing bank loans. This hypothesis is tested using the 
following regression.
P] = (3C. + (Insize^) + /32(firm type.) + (9)
Where:
P: = the share price of firm j at the
time of the loan announcement for 
sample firms and the mean share 
price over the sample period for 
other industry firms;
lnsize., = the natural logarithm of total firm
assets;
firm type., = 0 for industry control firms and 1
for firms receiving bank loans;
e. = a random error term.
Share prices for sample firms are for the day of the 
loan announcement. Share price for control firms is 
calculated as the mean share price obtained from COMPUSTAT 
files over the sample period.
Brennan and Hughes (1991, p. 1677) suggest that "a 
smaller firm must choose a lower share price in order to 
gain the same analysts following as a larger firm." To 
control for this firm size effect a size variable is 
included in the model. The natural logarithm of total firm 
assets is included as the measure of firm size rather than 
market capitalization to avoid redundancy in the 
independent variables.
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Total assets of sample firms are measured for the 
year of che loan announcement. The total asset measure for 
control firms is the mean firm total assets for the sample 
period obtained from COMPUSTAT. A separate regression is 
run for each one digit SIC industry group.
Tests of Hypothesis Four
Hypothesis four examines whether firms receiving bank 
loans make fewer presentations to the New York Society of 
Securities Analysts than firms not announcing bank loans. 
The following regression will be used to test this 
hypothesis.
#P-j = jSoj + ^(lnsize-i) + /S2(firm type.,) + e3 (10)
Where:
#P. = the number of presentations made at
the NYSSA during the current and 
preceding year;
size, = the natural logarithm of total firm
assets;
firm type, = 0 for industry control firms and 1
for firms receiving bank loans.
Anecdotal evidence suggests that the number of 
presentations to the NYSSA is also sensitive to firm size. 
To control for a possible firm size effect a size variable 
is included in the model. The same total assets measure of 
firm size that was used for tests of hypothesis three is 
used in this model. A separate regression is run for each 
one digit SIC industry group.
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The number of presentations made each year to the 
NYSSA decreased significantly over the sample period.
Table 3-1 indicates the combined number of presentations 
made by sample firms and control firms for each year.
Table 3-1
Number of presentations to the NYSSA by year
Year # Presentations
1986 108
1987 105
1988 85
1989 64
1990 84
1991 57
1992 37
Due to the significant decrease in the number of 
presentations made over the sample period a second test is 
performed. To facilitate year-to-year comparability 
restated number of presentations are calculated. 
Regressions are then run using the restated number of 
presentations. First, each firm's annual number of 
presentations is scaled by the mean number of 
presentations for the year to obtain the relative number 
of presentations.
Relative #P = #P / mean(#P)
Next, the relative measure is multiplied by the mean 
number of presentations for 1989, the mid year of the 
sample.
Restated #P = Relative #P x mean(#P)
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Comprehensive Tests
The final tests combine the various components of
hypotheses one through four. A number of studies show that
there is a significant difference in market response to
public debt issues and bank loan announcements [Mikkelson
and Partch (1986) and James (1987)] . Hypotheses three and
four test whether firms announcing bank loans have
significantly different share prices and number of
presentations to the NYSSA as compared to firms in the
same industry not announcing bank loans. Stickel (1992)
shows that share price influences the number of analysts
following a firm. Hypotheses one and two examine whether
the number and reputation of analysts following a firm
affect market response to bank loan announcements. These
relationships are summarized below:
share price number and
and NYSSA > reputation > return
presentations of analysts
The following regression combines the variables of 
hypotheses one through four:
SAR: = 0O + 0! (Insize.) + /?2 (NYSSA.) + 0,(P;) + /S4(PAAF.)
+ /?5 (PAF.) + jSs(PB.) + e.
Where:
SAR-, = the standardized abnormal return of
firm j ;
lnsize. = the natural logarithm of firm j
total assets;
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NYSSA = the number of presentations made at
the NYSSA during the preceding year;
Pj = the share price of firm j at the time
of the loan announcement;
PAAF-, = the number of All-American analysts
following firm j divided by the total 
number of analysts following the firm;
PRAF.j = the number of high reputation analysts
following firm j divided by the total 
number of analysts following the firm;
PAFj = the proportion of analysts following
firm j ;
PBj = the proportion of brokerages following
firm j .
PRB^ = the number of high reputation
brokerages following firm j divided by 
the total number of brokerage 
following the firm;
e, = a random error term.
The final test combines the variables tested in 
hypotheses one through four and industry dummy variables 
with variables banking theory suggests may influence 
market response to the loan announcement.
Summary
Chapter Three discusses the methods used to answer 
the research questions: 1) Does analyst following affect 
market response to bank loan announcements beyond that 
associated with firm size alone? and 2) Do firms receiving 
bank loans seek the attention of analysts less actively 
than firms not receiving bank loans? The method of 
obtaining the sample and the techniques used to test the 
hypotheses are discussed.
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CHAPTER t'OUR 
RESULTS
Chapter four reports the analyses and results of the 
study. The first section discusses sample selection 
procedures. The second section reports results of the 
tests of hypotheses. The final section summarizes study 
results.
Sample Selection 
Sample Selection Procedures
To obtain a sample, the Dow Jones News Service, also 
known as the broadtape, is searched for the period 198 7- 
1992 for announcements concerning credit agreements 
between nonbank corporations and banks. The date, time of 
the announcement, and full text of the announcement was 
obtained. Only firms with stock returns on the Center for 
Research in Security Prices (CRSP) daily files of the New 
York and American Stock Exchanges and the NASDAQ are 
included in the sample.
The event date is defined as precisely as possible. 
The closing price on the CRSP stock file for a particular
54
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date is the last trading price for that day on the
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on both the NYSE and the Pacific Stock Exchange (PACX), 
and the last trade occurs on the Pacific Stock Exchange, 
the closing price on that day represents the closing price 
on the PACX, not the NYSE. CRSP obtains price data for 
NASDAQ securities directly from the National Association 
of Securities Dealers (NASD) with the close of the day
being at 4:00 Eastern Time (CRSP Stock File Guide, 1991).
For this study the announcement day is defined as the date 
the Dow Jones News Service reports the announcement or the 
next trading day if the announcement is made after the 
close of trading for the particular exchange. The 
announcement day is noted as day 0 .
The Wall Street Journal Index (WSJ)was searched for 
other major corporate announcements around the time of the 
bank loan announcement. Observations are deleted from the 
sample if other news announcements are reported on the day 
of the bank loan announcement or two days before or after 
the announcement.
Sample Selection Results
The Dow Jones News Service search produced a sample 
of 765 announcements. Of this sample 378 had return data 
on CRSP and were uncontaminated by other major news. Fifty
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of these were loans by banks to other financial 
institutions or public utilities, leaving a final sample 
of 328. A search of the borrowing firms' annual reports 
indicates that there are 158 new loans, 116 favorable 
renewals or revisions of existing credit agreements, 4 6 
unfavorable renewals or revisions, and 8 cancellations. 
Characteristics of the Sample Firms
Table 4-1 reports descriptive statistics for the full 
sample and portfolios disaggragated by size for the 
following firm characteristics: total firm assets, size of 
credit agreement, maturity of agreement, and the number of 
participating banks. Firms are classified as small if 
total firm assets are in the bottom third of all firms 
listed on the NYSE and OTC COMPUSTAT files ranked
according to total assets. Firms are classified as large
if they are in the upper third of the COMPUSTAT firms and
medium if they are within the middle third.
Table 4-2 presents descriptive statistics for analyst 
following, number of high reputation analysts, number of 
All-American First Team analysts, brokerage following, and 
the number of high reputation brokerages disaggragated 
according to firm size. The mean number of analysts 
following a firm is 4.9 for the total sample. The mean is 
1.5, 4.7, and 15.9 for small, medium, and large firms
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T a b l e  4 - 1
Descriptive statistics for total firm assets, loan agreement 
amount, maturity of agreement and number of participating 
banks for the full sample and portfolios dissagregated 
according to firm size for 328 uncontaminated bank loan 
announcements.
Variable N Mean Standard
Deviation
Range
Total assets ($ millions) 
full sample 328 817 4218 2 - 65,219
small firms3 183 32 22 2 87
medium firms3 86 191 101 58 481
large firms3 59 4163 9294 335 - 65,219
Loan amount ($ millions) 
full sample 318 67 127 1 - 850
small firms3 177 14 21 1 - 235
medium firms3 84 75 104 2 - 850
large firms3 57 221 202 2 - 820
Maturity (years)
full sample 230 2 . 9 2.3 1 15
small firms3 125 2.3 1. 7 1 10
medium firms3 66 3.2 2.2 1 10
large firms3 39 4.3 3.3 1 15
No. of participating 
full sample
banks:b 
280 2.9 5.6 1 63
small firms3 172 1.3 . 6 1 4
medium firms3 73 2.6 2 .1 1 9
large firms3 35 11. 8 12.6 1 63
3 Firms are classified as small if total firm assets are in
the bottom third of all firms listed on the NYSE and OTC
COMPUSTAT files ranked according to total assets. Firms are 
classified as large if they are in the upper third of the 
COMPUSTAT firms and medium if they are within the middle 
third.
b Firms receiving a loan from a group of banks often list only 
the lead bank in the 10-K.
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T a b l e  4 - 2
Descriptive statistics for analyst following, number of high 
reputation analysts, number of All-American analysts, 
brokerage following, and the number of high reputation 
brokerages disaggragated according to firm size for 328 
uncontaminated bank loan announcements.
Variable N Mean Standard
Deviation
Range
Analyst following:
full sample 328 4.9 7.3 0 - 47
small firms3 183 1.5 2.1 0 9
medium firms3 86 4.7 4.6 0 - 20
large firms3 59 15.9 10 .1 0 - 47
High Reputation analyst following:
full sample 328 . 92 1.95 0 11
small firms3 183 . 11 .47 0 4
medium firms3 86 . 70 1.14 0 5
large firms3 59 3.75 2 . 92 0 - 11
Team 1 All-American Analysts:
full sample 328 .10 .34 0 2
small firms3 183 .02 . 14 0 1
medium firms3 86 .09 .33 0 2
large firms3 59 .37 .58 0 2
Brokerage following:
full sample 328 4.41 6.39 0 - 38
small firms3 183 1.42 1.91 0 - 10
medium firms3 86 4 .23 4 .13 0 19
large firms3 59 13 .93 8 .57 0 - 38
High Reputation brokerage following:
full sample 328 1.42 2 .72 0 14
small firms3 183 . 19 .52 0 3
medium firms3 86 1.20 1.87 0 8
large firms3 59 5 .53 3 .71 0 - 14
a Firms are classified as small if total firm assets are in
the bottom third of all firms listed on the NYSE and OTC 
COMPUSTAT files ranked according to total assets. Firms are 
classified as large if they are in the upper third of the 
COMPUSTAT firms and medium if they are within the middle 
third.
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respectively indicating a strong correlation between firm 
size and analyst following. However, che range of analyst 
following demonstrates that there are large firms with no 
following and small firms receiving considerable analyst 
attention. The mean number of brokerages following the 
firms is similar to the mean number of analysts indicating 
that brokerages usually have only one analyst following a 
firm.
Table 4-3 contains the one-day abnormal returns for 
the entire sample and the sample disaggragated by size and 
loan type. As expected, small firms experienced a larger 
market reaction to loan announcements than medium or large 
firms. Neither the medium nor the large firms experienced 
a significant market response for the full sample of loan 
announcements. When disaggragated according to loan type 
new loans and favorable renewals both experienced 
significantly positive abnormal returns for every size 
group while unfavorable renewals and terminations 
experienced significantly negative abnormal returns.
Previous research indicates that firm size and loan 
type may be the main explanatory factors in the market 
response to loan announcements (Lummer and McConnell,
1989; Slovin, Johnson, and Glascock, 1992). However, firms 
and loans differ on a number of dimensions. Table 4-4
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T a b l e  4 - 3
Average one-day announcement period excess returns for 
the full uncontaminated sample of 328 firms.
Type of Nu m b e r of O n e - d a y z Percent
of Observations excess statistic p o s i t i v e
A n n o u n c e m e n t return excess
returns
Panel A: Sample Disaggregated by Firm Characteristics
By exchange
NYSE/AMEX 143 .0123 2.13*+ 54.5
NASDAQ 185 .0101 2.62* 47.5
By time on CRSP files
Less than 1 year 37 .0201 3 .14* 54 .1
More than 1 year 269 .0094 2.45* 51.3
Removed within 1 yr 22 .0163 0.35 50 .0
By 1-digit SIC code
1-Mining 26 -.0013 -0 .12 42.3
2-Manufacturing 33 .0007 0.09 54 .5
3-Manufacturing 113 .0178 3 .01* 56.6
4 -Transportation 20 .0245 2.58* 65.0
5-Trade 66 .0139 2.13** 53 .0
7-Services 43 .0049 0.95 34.9
8-Services 27 .0003 -0.54 48 .1
Panel B : Sample Disaggregated by Loan Characteristic
By Security
Unsecured 194 . 0100 1.34 50.5
Secured 52 .0062 1. 07 59.6
Security Unknown 82 . 0166 3.83* 48 .8
By Structure of Agreement
Revolving 282 .0142 4 .18* 53 .2
Term 29 . 0036 0 . 04 37.9
Unknown 17 - . 0280 -2.28** 47 .1
By Maturity of Loan
1 Year 87 . 0049 0 .16 47 .2
Over 1 year 142 .0174 4.33* 54 . 9
Unknown 99 .0073 1.26 50.5
By Number of Participating Banks
1 bank 185 . 0158 3.49* 54.6
2-5 banks 70 .0042 0.86 55.7
5 or more 64 . 0019 0 .29 35 . 9
Unknown 9 .0314 1.30 66 . 6
significant at the .01 level
significant at the .05 level
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Average one-day announcement period excess returns for 
announcements of initial bank loans, favorable renewals, 
unfavorable renewals, and loan terminations.
Type of Number of One-day z Percent
of Observations excess statistic positive
Announcement return excess
returns
Panel A: full sample of uncontaminated loans
All announcements 328 .0111 3.37* 51.5
By firm size
small 183 .0161 3.92* 56.8
medium 86 . 0068 0.21 48 .8
large 59 . 0017 0 .80 38 . 9
By loan type
initial 158 .0201 5.64* 56.9
favorable renewal 116 .0312 6 .12* 60.3
unfavorable renewal 46 -.0486 -8.33* 15 .2
terminations 8 - .1315 -6.79* 25.0
Panel B : loan announcements disaggragated by firm size
Small firms
initial 89 .0283 5.69* 62 . 9
favorable renewal 70 .0370 4 .87* 61.4
unfavorable renewal 18 - .0637 -5 .63* 16.6
terminations 6 - .1696 -7.17* 33 .3
Medium firms
initial 40 . 0164 1.61*** 52.5
favorable renewal 28 .0265 3 .12* 64 . 2
unfavorable renewal 17 - .0471 -5.87* 17.6
terminations 1 -.0114 -0.58 00 . 0
Large firms
initial 29 . 0041 1.30*** 44 . 8
favorable renewal 18 . 0161 2 . 02** 50.0
unfavorable renewal 11 -.0262 -2.53* 10 .1
terminations 1 - .0229 -1.04 0 . 0
significant at the .01 level 
significant at the .05 level 
significant at the .10 level
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presents the one-day abnormal returns for the sample 
disaggregated by various firm and loan characteristics.
Lummer and McConnell (1989, 115) suggest four 
dimensions on which loans can differ: 1 ) relative size 
calculated as loan amount/firm size 2) maturity 3) whether 
the loan is secured or unsecured and 4) whether the loan 
is a term loan or a revolving credit agreement. Revolving 
credit agreements exhibit a significant positive one-day 
abnormal return while market response to term loans is 
insignificant. In addition, market response to loans which 
mature in one year or less is insignificant while loans 
with maturities longer than one year exhibit significant 
positive abnormal returns.
Research indicates that the exchange and industry to 
which a firm belongs are important firm characteristics 
(Bhushan, 1989a; Moyer, Chatfield, and Sisneros, 1989).
The sample firms in this study did respond differently 
according to industry affiliation. Only three SIC 
classifications experienced significant abnormal returns. 
The three significant industry groups were manufacturing 
(which includes the majority of the sample firms), 
transportation, and trade.
Diamond (1991) contends that there is a "life cycle 
effect in the use of borrowing through intermediaries. New
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borrowers borrow from banks initially but may later issue 
debt directly" (p. 690). Therefore, firms may differ 
depending on where they are in the borrowing 'life cycle'. 
Firms for which there is relatively little public 
information available would tend to use bank debt. Whether 
CRSP carries information on a firm is one possible 
indication of the amount of public information available. 
Therefore, the length of time CRSP reports information on 
a firm is examined. Results indicate that firms whose 
beginning data on the CRSP files is less than one year 
from the time of the loan announcement experience the 
largest one-day abnormal returns. These results are 
consistent with the theory that 'new' firms receive 
greater benefits from the prestige of receiving a bank 
loan.
Researchers suggest that monitoring of firms is one 
of the most important services performed by banks. 
Therefore, the number of banks monitoring the firm may 
also influence market reaction to loan announcements. When 
sample firms are classified by the number of banks 
participating in the loan the only group experiencing 
significant market responses are firms for which there is 
only one bank.
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Results of the Tests of Hypotheses 
This section presents the results of the analysis of 
the research hypotheses. Univariate and multivariate 
regressions are employed.
Hypothesis One
Hypothesis one examines whether analyst following 
reduces market response to bank loan announcements beyond 
that associated with firm size alone. Table 4-5 presents 
the results of regressions of standardized excess returns 
on analyst following, brokerage following, firm size, and 
combinations of these variables. As noted in Table 4-3 
initial loans and favorable renewals exhibit positive 
abnormal returns at the time of the loan announcement 
while unfavorable renewals and loan terminations exhibit 
a negative market response. To control for this 
difference in the total sample test, whenever the 
announcement is for an unfavorable renewal or loan 
cancellation the control variables are multiplied by -1 .
Panel A of Table 4-5 indicates that for the entire 
sample only the size variable is individually 
significant. When combined, analyst following and firm 
size are both insignificant and the sign on the 
coefficient of analyst following becomes negative.
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Results off regressions of standardized, excess returns cn analyst 
following, brokerage following and firm size for the whole sample 
(probability and partial R2 in parentheses).
Analyst
Following
Brokerage
Following
Ln(Firm 
Size)
Intercept Adj
R2
F
Panel
(1)
A: Total 
-0.0142 
( .1659)
Sample4
0.7185 
( .0001)
.0028 1
(
. 928 
.166)
(2) -0.0189 
( .1100)
0.7314 
( .0010)
.0048 2
(
. 568 
. 110)
(3) -0 .0845 
( .0413)
1.0237 
( .0001)
. 0097 4 .200
0413)
(4) 0.0049 
( .7584)
-.1002 
( .1267)
1.0684 
( .0001)
. 0069 2 . 140 
1193)
(5) -0.0005 
( .9792)
-0 .0832 
( .2050)
1.0200
(.0001)
. 0066 2 . 09 
1250)
Panel
(1)
B : Favorable Renewal and New Loans 
-0.1476 0.5713 
( .1678) ( .0001)
.0033 1
(
. 913 
.168)
(2) -0.0184 
( .1324)
0.5799 
( .0001)
.0047 2
(
.278
.1324)
(3) -0.0581 
( .1664)
0.7551 
( .0002)
.0034 1
(
. 926 
.166)
(4) -0.0082 
( .6336)
-0.0330 
( .6244)
0.6844 
( .0061)
.0005 1
(
.074
.343)
(5) -1.0133 
( .4999)
-0.0222 
( .7428)
0 .6555 
( .0086)
. 0014 1
(
. 189 
.301)
Panel
(1)
C: Unfavorable renewals 
0.0172 
( .5124)
and loan terminations 
-1.495 
( .0001)
- 0
(
.435
.512)
(2) 0.0226 
( .4666)
-1.5054 
( .0001)
- 0
(
. 538 
.467)
(3) 0.2278 
( .0479)
-2 .4657 
( .0001)
. 0553 4
(
.105
.048)
(4) -0.0504 
( .1936)
0.3987 
( .0238)
-2.9916 
( .0001)
. 0685 2
(
. 949 
. 062)
(5) -0.0526 
( .2493)
0.3768 
( .0311)
-2.9215 
( .0001)
. 0618 2
(
.746
.074)
4 For tests involving the total sample of firms whenever an 
announcement is unfavorable the control variables are multiplied by 
negative one.
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Similar results are obtained when brokerage following and 
firm size are combined in a model.
Panel B of Table 4-5 presents the results of 
regressions for the sample of favorable renewals and 
initial loans. For this sample brokerage following 
achieves the highest level of significance at .13. When 
combined, the significance of both analyst following and 
firm size decrease greatly while the coefficients on both 
variables remain negative. The same results are observed 
with brokerage following and firm size. These results 
differ from previous studies where firm size has been 
found to be significant. However, studies that have found 
a significant size effect for portfolios of favorable 
loan announcements have used the market capitalization 
measure.
Results of regressions for the sample of unfavorable 
renewals and loan terminations are given in Panel C of 
Table 4-5. Results indicate that firm size is the only 
individually significant variable. However, when either 
analyst following or brokerage following is included with 
the size variable the adjusted R2 of the model increases. 
The analyst and brokerage following coefficients are 
negative while the firm size coefficient is positive.
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Decreases in the probability of both firm size and 
analyst following in the combined models indicates chat 
the firm size and analyst following measures are somewhat 
redundant. However, increase in the R2 of some models 
demonstrates that there is an analyst following effect 
beyond that associated with firm size alone. The analyst 
and brokerage following effect is shown more clearly in 
the next section where firms are disaggregated according 
to firm size.
Hypothesis Two
The second hypothesis examines whether the 
reputation of the analysts and brokerages following a 
firm influence market response to bank loan 
announcements. Table 4-6 compares the results of 
regressions of standardized abnormal returns on the 
proportion of analyst and brokerage following with 
various measures of reputation. Results indicate that 
while analyst and brokerage following is insignificant 
for the sample as a whole, the reputation variables are 
significant.
The total sample is then divided into portfolios of 
favorable or unfavorable loan announcements. Table 4-7 
presents results of regressions of standardized abnormal 
returns on various measures of analyst and brokerage
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T a b l e  4 - 6
Results of regressions of standardized excess returns on various 
srspxitstion v 2.2T2.h1d1.s s fc2T TOTAL. LOAIT SAMPLE s cinci
unfavorable bank loan announcements. (Probability in parentheses) .
Variable Intercept Coefficient Adjusted R2
Panel A: Analysts
Proportion 
Analyst (PAF)
0.71852 
( . 0001)
-0 .68253 
( .1659)
. 0028
Percent of high 
reputation 
analysts (PRAF)
0 .74186 
(.0001)
-1.15470 
(.0130)
.0158
Percent of All- 
American Team 1 
analysts (PAAF)
0.66999 
(.0001)
-1.97630 
( .0908)
. 0057
Panel B: Brokerages
Proportion 
Brokerages (PB)
0.73139 
(.0001)
-0.73767 
(.1100)
.0048
Percent high 
reputation 
brokerages (PRB)
0 .74202 
( .0001)
-0.61090 
(.0520)
.0085
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T a b l e  4 - 7
Results of regressions of standardized excess returns on 
various variables for INITIAL LOANS and FAVORABLE RENEWALS.
Independent Variables Full Small Medium Large
Sample Firms Firms Firms
(273) (158) (67) (46)
Ln(firm size) - .0581 - .0801 .3386 -.0072
Probability (.165) (.552) (.211) (-953)
Adjusted R2 - - - -
Analyst Following (AF) -.0147 - .0136 -.0618 . 0102
Probability (.167) ( .784) (.033) ( .521)
Adjusted R2 - - (.052) -
Reputable Analysts (RA) -.0484 -.2143 -.1652 . 0264
Probability (.206) (.308) (.135) ( .602)
Adjusted R2 - - ( .018) -
Team 1 All-Americans(AA) - .0842 - . 775 - .283 .3443
Probability (.688) ( .254) ( .458) ( .136)
Adjusted R2 - - - ( .027)
Brokerage Following (B) - .0184 - .0212 - .0728 . 0115
Probability (.132) ( .698) (.023) (.539)
Adjusted R2 - - (.062) -
Reputable Brokerages(RB) - .0321 -.1393 - .1085 . 0309
Probability ( .243) ( .484) (.141) ( .439)
Adjusted R2 “ -
'
PAF Proportion AF 0.7086 0.6549 2.9668 -0.4909
Probability (.168) (.784) (.033) ( .521)
Adjusted R2 - - (.052) -
PRAF (RA/AF) -0.9214 -1.4858 -0.5192 0 .0897
Probability (.038) (.081) (.475) ( .921)
Adjusted R2 (.012) (.013) - -
PAAF (AA/AF) -1.6050 -1.9392 -0.9127 2.4022
Probability (.126) (.131) ( .732) ( .459)
Adjusted R2 (.005) (.008) - -
PB Proportion B -0.7173 -0.8296 -2.8422 0.4493
Probability ( .132) (.698) (.023) ( .539)
Adjusted R2 ( .005) - (.062) -
PRB (RB/B) -0.5152 -0.6611 -0.3149 0.2319
Probability (.091) ( .253) (.530) ( .759)
Adjusted R2 (.007) ~
"
a Firms are classified as small if total firm assets are in the 
bottom third of all firms listed on the NYSE and OTC COMPUSTAT files 
ranked according to total assets. Firms are classified as large if 
they are in the upper third of the COMPUSTAT firms and medium if 
they are within the middle third.
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following and reputation for the full sample of initial 
loans and favorable renewals and for portfolios based on 
firm size. Panel A provides regression results based on 
the number and reputation of analysts and brokerages 
following a firm. Panel B contains the results of 
regressions based on proportion and percentage variables 
of analyst and brokerage following. Medium size firms are 
the only group where analyst and brokerage following 
explains a significant portion of market response to the 
loan announcement. For favorable renewals and new loan 
announcements by medium size firms results indicate a 
significant negative relationship between market response 
and either the number of analysts or the number of 
brokerages following the firm.
Again, results presented in Panel B indicate that 
there is a significant negative relationship between 
market response and the proportion of analyst and 
brokerage following for medium size firms. In addition, 
market response to favorable loan announcements by small 
firms is significantly reduced as the percentage of high 
reputation analysts and All-American Team One analysts 
increases. None of the variables are significant for 
large firms. Therefore, results indicate that analyst and
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brokerage reputation may be more important to small firms 
than either medium or large firms.
Table 4-8 presents the results of regressions of 
standardized abnormal returns on various measures of 
analyst and brokerage reputation for the sample of 
unfavorable renewals and loan terminations. The only 
significant variable for this portfolio is firm size. The 
insignificance of analyst and brokerage following for 
this portfolio of loans may be partially due to the 
practice of sell-side analysts to follow and comment on 
firms that are doing well.
Hypothesis Three
The third hypothesis examines whether share prices 
of firms receiving bank loans are significantly higher 
than share prices of firms not announcing bank loans 
after controlling for firm size. Table 4-9 presents 
descriptive statistics for share prices and total firm 
assets by one-digit SIC codes. Most of the sample firms 
have a one-digit SIC code of three. As expected, there is 
considerable variation in the mean share prices of the 
various industry groups.
Table 4-10 presents the results of regressions of 
share price on the natural logarithm of total firm assets 
and a dummy variable indicating if the firm announced
R eproduced  with perm ission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without perm ission.
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T a b l e  4 - 8
Results of regressions of standardized excess returns on 
various variables for UNFAVORABLE RENEWALS and 
TERMINATIONS of BANK LOANS.
Independent Variables Full
Sample
(53)
Small
Firms
(23)
Medium
Firms
(17)
Large
Firms
(11)
Ln(firm size) .2278 .708 .522 - .117
Probability (.047) (.146) ( .407) ( .253)
Adjusted R2 .055 - - -
Analyst Following (AF) - .0171 .205 - . 062 - .009
Probability ( .512) ( .456) (.393) ( .294)
Adjusted R2 - - - -
Reputable Analysts (RA) .0788 .659 - .056 - .043
Probability (.510) ( -784) (.890) ( .253)
Adjusted R2 - - - -
Team 1 All-Americans(AA) . 792 a 1.034 . 047
Probability (.346) ( .515) (.857)
Adjusted R2 - - -
Brokerage Following (B) .022 .223 - . 052 - .011
Probability ( .466) ( .479) (.558) (.314)
Adjusted R2 - - - -
Reputable Brokerages(RB) . 0447 . 579 - .118 -.0329
Probability (.601) (.569) (.500) (.266)
Adjusted R2
3 Jin.' ■ ____ ___ ____ IT c. -• .
termination that were followed by a Team-1 All-American analyst. 
b None of the variables PAF, PRAF, PAAF, PB, or PRB were significant 
for the sample as a whole or disaggregated according to firm size. 
c Firms are classified as small if total firm assets are in the 
bottom third of all firms listed on the NYSE and OTC COMPUSTAT files 
ranked according to total assets. Firms are classified as large if 
they are in the upper third of the COMPUSTAT firms and medium if 
they are within the middle third.
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T a b l e  4 - 9
Descriptive Statistics for share prices and total firm 
assets by one-digit SIC code. For sample firms share 
price is the price at the date of the loan and firm size 
is total assets for the year of the loan. Share price and 
total assets for control firms are measured as tne mean 
share price and total assets for the firm over the sample 
period (1987-1992) .
N
Share
Mean
Prices---
Range
---- Total Assets----
N Mean Range
SIC 1
Sample Firms 
Industry
26
141
7 .46 
11. 99
.28-43.12 
.38-48.13
26
141
366
757
16- 1721 
3-17451
SIC 2
Sample Firms 
Industry
33
430
11.73 
26 . 05
.14-47.37
.73-87.66
33
430
559
2620
5- 6254 
1-87498
SIC 3
Sample Firms 
Industry
113
802
8.73 
16 . 93
.22-67.12 
.32-91.56
113
802
578
891
2-17381
1-85103
SIC 4
Sample Firms 
Industry
20
92
22 .46 
29 .11
1.56-66.50
1.71-86.06
20
92
3861
4512
16-22290
4-46518
SIC 5
Sample Firms 
Industry
66
315
5 .19 
17.35
.07-38.13 
.24-78 .66
66
315
1379
681
2-65219
3-14572
SIC 7
Sample Firms 
Industry
43
190
10.56 
15 . 85
.03-57.75
.27-64.66
43
190
324
408
2- 4045 
1- 6630
SIC 8
Sample Firms 
Industry
27
104
6 . 65 
15 .26
1.35-19.63 
1.11-52.75
27
104
169
404
7- 2445 
4-10843
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T a b l e  4 - 1 0
Results of regressions of share price on the natural 
logarithm of rirm size and firm classification by SIC 
code. The dummy loan variable classifies firms as either 
announcing a bank loan or not.
In (Firm 
size)
Loan
Dummy Intercept
Adjusted
R2 F
Full 5.331 -5 .149 -9 .041 .4560 986
Sample ( .0001) (.0001) ( .0001) ( . 0001)
SIC 1 3 .789 -2.843 -8.246 .3242 39
( .0001) (.1532) (.0335) ( .0001)
SIC 2 5 .897 -8.725 -8.115 .5211 251
(.0001) (.0002) (.0001) ( . 0001)
SIC 3 5 .232 -4.317 -9.005 .4311 341
( .0001) (.0002) (.0001) ( . 0001)
SIC 4 5.986 -2.784 -9.003 .4803 51
( .0001) (.4065) ( .0105) ( . 0001)
SIC 5 4 . 629 -6.464 -7.092 .4108 128
(.0001) (.0001) (.0001) ( .0001)
SIC 7 4 .306 -4.104 -3.244 .3256 54
(.0001) (.0245) (.1106) ( . 0001)
SIC 8 3 .462 -5.003 -0.286 .2881 26
( .0001) ( .0278) ( .9153) ( . 0001)
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receiving a bank loan (1) or not (0). Contrary to 
expectations the dummy variable is significantly negative 
for all SIC codes except one and four where the 
coefficient is insignificant. These results indicate that 
the sample of firms announcing bank loans has 
significantly lower share prices after controlling for 
firm size than do other firms within the industry. 
Hypothesis Four
The fourth hypothesis examines whether the number of 
presentations made to the New York Society of Security 
Analyst (NYSSA) by firms receiving bank loans is 
significantly lower than the number or presentations made 
by firms in the same industry not announcing bank loans. 
Table 4-11 presents descriptive statistics on the mean 
number of NYSSA presentations and firm size for both 
sample firms and other firms within the industry. Again, 
there is considerable variation in the means between 
industry groups.
Table 4-12 presents the results of regressions of 
the number of presentations to the NYSSA on the natural 
logarithm of total firm assets and a dummy variable 
indicating whether the firm announced receiving a bank 
loan (1) or not (0). For the total sample and SIC codes 
one, three, and seven the dummy coefficient is
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T a b l e  4 - 1 1
Descriptive statistics for presentations to the NYSSA and 
total assets by SIC code.
---#
N
Presentations-- 
Mean Range N
--- Total
Mean
Assets---
Range
SIC 1
Sample Firms 
Industry
24
186
.1363 
. 0468
0-1.00 
0-0 .57
24
154
365
716
16- 1721 
3-17451
SIC 2
Sample Firms 
Industry
33
523
. 0312 
.0264
0-1.00
0-0.57
33
469
559
2444
5- 6254 
1-87498
SIC 3
Sample Firms 
Industry
113
916
.0594 
. 0286
0-1.00
0-1.00
113
859
580
983
2-17381
1-85103
SIC 4
Sample Firms 
Industry
20
114
. 1000 
. 0576
0-1.00
0-0.85
20
99
3862
4242
16-22290
4-46518
SIC 5
Sample Firms 
Industry
66
338
.0178 
. 0278
0-1.00
0-0.85
66
338
1392
676
2-65219
3-14572
SIC 7
Sample Firms 
Industry
43
214
. 0588 
. 0200
0-1.00 
0-0 .43
43
205
324
411
2- 4045 
1- 6630
SIC 8
Sample Firms 
Industry
27
122
.0000
.0117 0-0.28
27
117
153
372
7- 2211 
2-10652
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T a b l e  4 - 1 2
Results of regressions of number of presentations to the 
NYSSA on one natural logarithm of firm size and firm 
classification by SIC code. Firms are classified as 
either receiving a bank loan(l) or not(O).
In (Firm 
size)
Loan
Dummy Intercept
Adjusted
R2 F
Full
Sample
0 .011 
( .0001)
0 . 030 
( .0001)
-0 . 030 
(.0001)
. 0400 53 . 0 
( . 0001)
SIC 1 0 . 038 
( .0001)
0 .094 
(.0062)
-0.146 
(.0003)
.1562 17 . 0 
( . 0001)
SIC 2 0 . 006 
( .0003)
0 .011 
( .488)
-0.009 
( .383)
.0224 7 . 0 
( .0013)
SIC 3 0 . 009 
( .0001)
0 . 035 
( .0044)
-0.016 
(.1400)
. 0242 13 .0 
( . 0001)
SIC 4 0 . 037 
( .0001)
0 . 054 
( .2250)
-0.183 
(.0009)
. 1607 12 .0 
( . 0001)
SIC 5 0 .005 
( .0953)
-0.004 
(.7650)
0 . 007 
(.9659)
.0033 1.6 
( .1937)
SIC 7 0 . 013 
(.0016)
0 . 042 
( . 0286)
-0.040 
(.0457)
. 0494 7 . 0 
(.0009)
SIC 8 0 .001 
( .3828)
-0.011 
( .2391)
0 . 004 
(.6844)
- 1.3 
(.2894)
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significantly positive indicating that firms announcing 
bank loans generally make more presentations to the NYSSA 
than other firms within their industry after controlling 
for firm size. Restating the number of presentations made 
by sample firms to 1989 equivalents produces similar 
results. The dummy coefficient for the full sample of 
firms is positive (.0272) and significant at the .006 
level. Results from tests of hypotheses three and four 
suggest that firms announcing bank loans are actively 
seeking the attention of analysts more than other firms 
within the industry. Results are consistent with Diamonds 
theory that firms use bank debt to build their reputation 
in the public debt markets.
Comprehensive Tests
When all variables tested in hypotheses one through 
four are included in a regression model the F statistic 
for the model as a whole is insignificant. Therefore, 
stepwise regression procedures were used to determine 
significant variables. The correlation of the estimates 
between these variables is given in Table 4-13. The only 
highly correlated estimates are the proportion of 
brokerages (PB) and the proportion of analyst following 
(PAF). Results of the stepwise regressions of 
standardarized abnormal returns on the following
R eproduced  with perm ission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without perm ission.
Table 4-13 
Correlation of Estimates
7 9
CORRB
LSIZE
PAAF
PRAF
PAF
PB
PRB
NYSSA
PRICE
CORRB
LSIZE
PAAF
PRAF
PAF
PB
PRB
NYSSA
PRICE
LSIZE
1.0000 
0.0809 
0 . 0737 
0.0914 
0.0184 
0.1500 
0.0821 
0.1476
PB
-0.0184 
0.0206 
-0.1441 
-0.9811
1.0000 
0.0949 
-0.2827 
-0.1649
PAAF
0.0809
1.0000 
-0.3300 
-0.0154 
0.0206 
-0.0329 
-0.0329 
-0.0097
PRB
-0.1500 
-0.0329 
-0.5972 
- 0.1211 
0.0949
1.0000 
-0 .0554 
0.1161
PRAF
-0 .0737 
-0.3300
1.0000 
0 .1445 
-0 .1441 
-0.5972 
0.0484 
-0.1238
NYSSA
-0.0821 
-0.0329 
0 . 0484 
0 .2685 
-0.2827 
-0.0554
1.0000 
0.0402
PAF
-0 . 0914 
-0.0154 
0.1445
1.0000 
-0.9811 
- 0.1211 
0.2685 
0.0884
PRICE
-0.1476 
-0 . 0097 
-0.1238 
0.0884 
-0.1649 
0.1161 
0.0402
1.0000
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variables are presented in Table 4-14: firm size, PAAF, 
PRAF, PAF, PB, PRB, NYSSA presentations, and share price. 
For the total sample of favorable and unfavorable loan 
announcements the percent of high reputation analysts 
(PRAF) and share price are the only significant 
variables.
When the portfolio is disaggregated according to 
loan type, results indicate that the coefficient for the 
percent of high reputation analysts is significantly 
negative for the portfolio of new loans and favorable 
renewals as a whole. These results indicate that higher 
reputation analysts reduce the market's response to bank 
loan announcements.
Firm size is the only significant variable for the 
portfolio of unfavorable announcements. After the 
portfolio is disaggregated according to size none of the 
variables are significant.
Table 4-15 presents the results of employing 
stepwise regressions of standardized abnormal returns on 
variables included in tests of hypotheses one through 
four and other variables which banking theory suggests 
may influence market response to the loan announcement.
For the total sample of favorable and unfavorable 
loan announcements the percent of high reputation analyst
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Results of stepwise regressions of standardized abnormal returns (SAR) on the variables from 
hypotheses one through four (firm size, proportion analyst following (PAF), Q„ All-American 
analysts (PAAF), % high reputation analysts (PRAF), proportion of brokerages (PB), percent of 
high reputation brokerages (PRB), share price, and the number or presentations to the NYSSA).
Ln
Intercept Size PRAF PB
Share
Price
Adjusted
R 2
F
statistic
Panel A: Total Sample 
All
Announcements
0.8138 
( .0001)
-0.8617 
( .083)
-0.0110
(.011)
.021 4.42
(.013)
Panel B: Initial Loans 
Full Sample:
and Favorable Renewals 
0 . 576 
( .0001)
-0.921 
( .038)
.012 4 . 33 
(.038)
Small Firms: 0.6375 
( .0001)
-1.486 
( .081)
.013 3.08
(.081)
Medium Firms: -3.211 0.8052 
(.0235) (.0056)
-4.6201 
(.0008)
.154 7. 10 
( .0016)
Large Firms: no significant models can be formed
Panel C: Unfavorable renewals and loan terminations 
Full Sample: -2.4 65 0.22 78
(.0001) (.048)
.055 4 .11 
(.048)
No significant models can be formecT for small, medium or large unfavorable portfolios.
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Table 4-15
Results of stepwise regressions of standardized abnormal returns (SAR) on the variables from hypotheses 
one through four (firm size, proportion analyst following (PAF), % All-American analysts (PAAF), 1 high 
reputation analysts (PRAF), proportion of brokerages (PB), percent of high reputation brokerages (PRB), 
share price, and the number or presentations to the NYSSA)and other variables banking theory suggests may 
influence market response (industry classification, loan maturity, security, structure of the loan 
agreement, the proportion of loan amount, to total firm assets, the number of participating banks and the 
time on the CRSP files).
Inter- In 
cept (size) PRAF PB
Share 
Pr i ce SIC2
 Dummy  Adj
SIC5 PAMT ((Banks Age R2
Panel A: Total Sample 
-0.332 
(.0 0 1 )
0 . 1 9 2  
(.0001)
0. 318 
( .04)
, 2 0 1 4 0. 92 
1 .0 0 1 )
Panel B: Initial Loans and Favorable Renewals 
Full Sample: 0.536 -0.070
(.0001) (.053)
0. 350 
( -135)
, 017 3.27
(.039)
S m a 11 F i rms: 0 . 668 
( .0001)
-0.054 
( . 03)
0.467 
( .07)
0.613 
( .06)
.053 3.93
(.0 1 )
Medium Firms: 
Large Firms:
-3.071 0.7 65
(.029) (.008)
1.189 
(.002 )
-4.591 
(.0009)
0. 635 
( .09)
-0.858 
( .0 2 )
181
085
(..23 
( .001)
4 .00 
( .0 2 )
Panel C: Unfavorable Renewals and Loan Terminations SIC1 SIC8 PAMT
Full Sample: -0.736 -2.023 -0.829
(.002) (.03) (.003)
,208 7.18
(.002)
S m a 1 1 Fi rm s : 
Medium Firms
-0.4b2 
( .22 )
-0.948 
( .006)
1.826 -1.257 
(.09) (.001)
-3.836 -2.127 
(.004) (.022)
,398 7.28
(.005)
484 6.21
(.004)
u r g e  I i r m s ; : Ho signilicant models cun be formed 00
NJ
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following and the loan amount as a percent of total 
assets provides an R: of .201. However, the significance 
of variables varies according to the type of loan 
(favorable or unfavorable) and firm size. Industry dummy 
variable coefficients are significant for small and 
medium firms in both the favorable and unfavorable loan 
announcement portfolios. In addition, for small firms the 
share price coefficient is also significantly positive 
for the portfolio of favorable loan announcements. These 
results indicate that lower share prices for small firms 
result in higher market response to the announcement. The 
coefficient for the proportion of brokerages is 
significantly negative for medium firms with favorable 
loan announcements indicating a lower market response as 
the proportion of brokerages increases. The only 
significant variable for the portfolio of large firms 
with favorable loan announcements is the dummy variable 
for the number of banks. This finding indicates that 
loans to large firms involving five or more banks result 
in significantly lower market response than loans 
involving fewer banks.
Industry classification and the loan amount as a 
percent of total firm assets are the only significant 
variables for the portfolio of unfavorable loan
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announcements. For the portfolio of small firms with 
unfavorable loan announcements the relative size of che 
loan is positively related market response. Therefore, as 
the loan as a percent of total assets increases market 
response to an unfavorable loan announcement becomes more 
negative.
Measures of analyst and brokerage following and 
reputation are not significant for either the portfolio 
of unfavorable loan announcements as a whole or portfolio 
disaggregated according to firm size. Research indicates 
that analysts may be reluctant to issue negative reports 
as this might endanger their relationship with firm 
management. Such reluctance could account for the 
insignificance of the analyst and brokerage variables for 
the portfolio of unfavorable loan announcements. Schipper 
(1991) notes that losing access to management may be 
costly to sell-side analysts. "Analysts rank company 
management among the top five sources of information used 
in making judgements and decisions, so it seems 
reasonable to expect that they would like to maintain 
good relations with, and ready access to, managers" 
(Schipper 1991, 115).
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Summary
Chapter four reports the analyses and results of the 
study. Section one discusses sample selection procedures 
and results and presents firm characteristics. The second 
section presents results of univariate and multivariate 
regression tests of the hypotheses.
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CHAPTER FIVE 
SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS
Chapter five summarizes the study and the 
conclusions reached. Section one provides a brief 
overview of the study. The second section discusses the 
expected findings of the study. Results and implications 
of the study are presented in section three. Finally, 
study limitations and suggestions for future research are 
presented.
Overview of the Study 
Research suggests that banks may have a comparative 
advantage in performing at least two valuable functions, 
information gathering and monitoring. The primary 
responsibility of analysts is also to gather and 
disseminate information on firms. However, it is not 
known how analyst following affects market response to 
bank loan announcements.
This study examined two research questions: 1) Does 
analyst and brokerage following affect market response to 
bank loan announcements beyond that associated with firm 
size alone? and 2) Do firms receiving bank loans seek the 
attention of analysts less actively than firms not
86
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receiving bank loans? To answer these questions the 
following methods were used.
A sample of firms receiving bank loans was obtained 
by searching the Dow Jones News Wire for the period 1987 
through 1992 for announcements of bank loan agreements. 
Loans were classified as initial loans, favorable 
renewals, unfavorable renewals, or loan cancellations on 
the basis of information contained in the announcement 
and the firm's Form 10-K. Standard event study 
methodology was used to determine share price response to 
the loan announcements. Next, standardized abnormal 
returns were aggregated across firms. Finally, firm 
specific factors were examined as a means of explaining 
the observed abnormal returns. Factors examined included: 
(1 ) the number of analysts and brokerages following a 
firm, (2 ) the reputation of the analysts and brokerages, 
(3) firm share price, (4) the number of presentations 
made to the New York Society of Security Analysts 
(NYSSA). In addition, the following variables which 
banking theory suggests may influence market response to 
bank loan announcements were examined: (1 ) relative size
of the loan, (2) loan maturity, (3) loan security, (4) 
structure of the loan agreement, (5) the number of banks
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participating in the loan, and (6 ) the length of time 
firm data has been carried on CRSP capes.
Expectations
Firm size, brokerage and analyst following, and the 
reputation of the information providers were expected to 
be negatively related to the market response's response 
to the bank loan announcement. In addition, sample firms 
were expected to have higher share prices and make fewer 
presentations to the New York Society of Security 
Analysts (NYSSA) than other firms within the same 
industry after controlling for size. This section 
presents the theoretical reasons for these expectations.
Slovin, Johnson, and Glascock (1992) find that when 
a sample of bank loan announcements is grouped according 
to firm size, positive stock price reactions occur only 
for the sample of small firms. As a group, large firms 
experience only normal returns. Market capitalization was 
the proxy for firm size. These results imply that the 
amount of information regarding a firm which is publicly 
available may influence market response to the bank loan 
announcement. Therefore, firm size was expected to be 
negatively related to the market's response to the bank 
loan announcement. However, because share price was a
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variable of interest in this study, total firm assets 
were ussc*. ss s. pjroxy fo2T firrn SiZ6.
The amount of publicly available information 
regarding a firm depends to a large extent on the 
information production and dissemination activities of 
financial analysts. Results of Dempsey's (1989) 
examination of market response to annual earnings 
announcements indicates that increased analyst following 
reduces the information content of earnings announcements 
even after controlling for firm size. Dempsey's findings 
are consistent with Arbel and Strebel's (1983) finding 
that after controlling for size, the number of analysts 
following a firm is negatively related to the firm's 
annual return. It was hypothesized that increased analyst 
and brokerage following would also reduce market response 
to bank loan announcements.
A simplifying assumption made in most studies that 
examine analyst following is that analysts do not differ 
in quality. However, there is a substantial amount of 
theoretical and empirical evidence indicating that the 
reputation of information providers is important. In 
addition, the financial press often expresses the opinion 
that the reputation of financial analysts is important. 
Therefore, the reputation of analysts and brokerages was
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hypothesized to be negatively related to the market's 
response to bank loan announcements.
Moyer, Chatfield, and Sisneros (1989) contend that 
analysts reduce the agency costs of public debt and 
equity through by monitoring managerial performance. 
Therefore, firms issuing public debt may try to attract 
the attention of analysts as a means of reducing agency 
costs of debt. Alternatively, firms may choose bank 
monitoring. Research indicates that firms can attract 
analyst attention by: 1 ) increasing the potential 
economic benefit of information searches by lowering 
share price and 2 ) reducing analyst search costs by 
providing information to analysts through direct contact. 
Expectations were that firms receiving information 
gathering and monitoring services from banks via bank 
loans would seek the attention of analysts less actively 
than firms not receiving bank loans.
Results
Results are presented for tests of hypotheses one 
through four. Next, results of combined tests of the 
hypotheses are reported.
Hypothesis one examined whether analyst following 
reduces market response to bank loan announcements beyond 
that associated with firm size alone. Support was found
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for this hypothesis. Model adjusted R2 increased when 
either analyst or brokerage following was included with 
the size variable for the portfolio of unfavorable loan 
announcements. However, the analyst and brokerage 
following effect was strongest for medium size firms 
making favorable loan announcements.
The second hypothesis examined whether the 
reputation of analysts and brokerages following a firm 
influence market response to the bank loan announcement. 
Results indicate that analyst and brokerage reputation 
are significant determinates of market response for the 
portfolio of small firms with favorable loan 
announcements. In contrast, market response to favorable 
loan announcements of medium size firms are significantly 
influenced by analyst and brokerage following only. 
Neither the analyst and brokerage following variables nor 
measures of the reputation of the information providers 
were significant for the portfolio of large firms.
The third hypothesis examined whether share prices 
of firms receiving bank loans are significantly higher 
than share prices of firms not announcing bank loans 
after controlling for firm size. Contrary to 
expectations, results indicate that the sample of firms 
announcing bank loans has significantly lower share
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prices after controlling for firm size than do other 
fi2TTuS in tills sains industry.
The fourth hypothesis examined whether the number of 
presentations made to the NYSSA by firms receiving bank 
loans is significantly lower than the number of 
presentations made by firms in the same industry not 
announcing bank loans. Again, results were contrary to 
expectations. Firms announcing bank loans generally made 
more presentations to the NYSSA than other firms in their 
industry after controlling for firm size.
The final test examined variables from the first 
four hypotheses with variables which banking theory 
suggests may influence market response to bank loan 
announcements. Results indicate that the significance of 
the variables depends on the type of loan announcement 
(favorable or unfavorable) and firm size. Results 
indicate that generally increases in the percent of high 
reputation analysts following a firm reduce market 
response to loan announcements. Market response to the 
loan also increases as the relative size of the loan 
increases.
In addition, market response to the portfolios of 
favorable loan announcements is significantly influenced 
by a number of variables which seem to depend on the size
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of the firm. Market response to favorable announcements 
by small firms is influenced by both the firm's share 
price and the length of time data has been available on 
the CRSP tapes. For medium size firms the proportion of 
brokerage following is significant. Finally, the only 
significant variable for the portfolio of large firms is 
the number of banks. Results indicate that loans to large 
firms involving five or more banks result in 
significantly lower market response.
For the portfolio of unfavorable loan announcements 
measures of analyst and brokerage following and 
reputation are not significant. Industry and the relative 
amount of the loan are the only significant variables for 
this portfolio of loan announcements. Results indicate 
that the market responds more negatively to unfavorable 
loan announcements as the relative size of the loan 
increases.
Conclusions
Support was found for Hypotheses One and Two.
Results indicate that there is an analyst and brokerage 
following effect that is not accounted for by firm size 
alone. In addition, the reputation of the analyst or 
brokerage is significant for portfolios of favorable loan 
announcements. Finally, the importance of both following
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and reputation measures seems to vary depending on the 
type of loan announcement (favorable or unfavorable) and 
firm size.
Results were contrary to expectations for Hypotheses 
Three and Four. Firms announcing bank loans have lower 
share prices and make more presentations to the NYSSA 
after controlling for size than other firms within the 
same industry. These results indicate that firms 
announcing bank loans are actively seeking the attention 
of analysts more than other firms. Results are consistent 
with Diamond's suggestion that firms use bank debt as a 
means of building reputation. Part of the reputation 
building process may also be lowering share prices in 
order to provide an economic incentive for analysts and 
brokerages to gather information and monitor the firm. 
Direct contact through presentations at the NYSSA is 
another means of building the firms reputation with 
analysts and brokerages.
Finally, other variables which banking theory 
suggests may influence market response to bank loan 
announcements are found to be significant for particular 
loan type by firm size portfolios of firms. Industry 
classification and the relative size of the loan are 
significant for the portfolio of unfavorable loan
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announcements. Finally, industry classification, the 
number of banks participacing in the loan, the length of 
time firm data has been available on the CRSP tapes, and 
the relative size of the loan are significant for 
portfolios of favorable bank loan announcements 
disaggregated by firm size.
Limitations
Certain limitations of the study must be recognized. 
First, in examining whether firms actively seek the 
attention of analysts only share prices and NYSSA 
presentations are considered. Bhushan (1989a) and Moyer, 
Chatfield, and Sisneros (1989) have identified a number 
of firm characteristics that influence analyst following. 
The characteristics they identify are relatively stable 
and not easily changed. However, there may also be a 
number of steps firms might take to attract analysts' 
attention without making major firm changes other than 
share prices and presentations to the NYSSA.
Second, presentations to the NYSSA are only an 
indirect measure of the amount of contact between 
analysts and the firm. Presentations to NYSSA are very 
formal with senior company officials speaking to a large 
group of analysts and guests. Informal meetings between 
individual analysts and the firm occur much more
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frequently. Firms also make presentations to specific 
brokerages and local or regional analyst associations. 
Therefore, NYSSA presentations are only the end of a 
spectrum of possible contacts between the firm and 
analysts.
Finally, various proxies for firm size have been 
used in research. Market capitalization is the measure 
most often used in studies examining market response to 
loan announcements. Market capitalization is obtained by 
multiplying share price by the number of outstanding 
shares of the firm. Therefore, to avoid redundancy in the 
independent variables the firm size measure used in this 
study was total firm assets. Use of the total asset 
measure of firm size reduces the problem of redundant 
variables, but makes the comparability between this study 
and other bank loan announcement studies more difficult.
Suggestions for Future Research
The models developed in this study used only a few 
of the many possible measures of analyst and brokerage 
reputation. A number of professional journals rank 
brokerages according to various performance and size 
measures. Future researchers could include these 
alternative measures of analyst and brokerage reputation 
in models which examine the relative importance of the
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amount and reputation of analyst and brokerage following
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In addition, this study focused on the number and 
reputation of sell side analysts only. Analysis of buy 
side analysts characteristics may also provide important 
insights into the relation between the information 
gathering and monitoring services provided by banks and 
similar services provided by financial analysts.
Finally, more precise measures on the amount and 
quality of information flows between financial analysts 
and firms could be developed. Economic constraints and 
incentives faced by financial analysts may be influenced 
by the amount and quality of information supplied to them 
by the firm.
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